Research On The Profit Allocation Problem Of The Coalition Enterprise Based On The Cooperation Game

In the classic cooperative game, the players who choose a cooperative strategy must cooperate until the game is over. But in real life, as game players the coalition enterprises which have a certain degree of decision-making power can decide when to take the strategy. So this paper mainly discusses the problem of the distribution of the benefits within the coalition enterprises which own decision-making power in the coalition structure game. The main findings are as follows:First, based on the Cooperative game theory, the characteristic functions of the coalition structure game are derived by the backward induction algorithm, and the method about the selection of the optimal path is obtained. Then the above conclusions are used to the part of the game player who own decision-making power in the cooperation game. Father more the game of the coalition split structure is studied. Some methods are got.Secondly, the games which use the Shapley Value for the distribution of the benefits must be convex game and its characteristic function must satisfy the super-additivity, then this distribution is not possessed, but not all the structure of the game satisfy the above requirements. This article introduce a new allocation method——The average tree solution. The average tree distribution is proved to meet Parameterized fairness and Parameterized validity, and its properties were studied. This paper discusses its properties and gets some inferences. By comparing this method is better than the Shapley Value in the example.Finally, Supply chain companies are abstracted to the coalition-players in the direction ring network, the distribution of benefits of the Union about the two difficult structures is discussed. The conclusion is in this type of the game the income that the companies join in coalition is higher than the uncooperative.