A Cooperative Game Analysis Of Dynamics Coalition's Profit Allocation

In the purpose of enjoying techniques resources and sharing expenses, and mastering the fast-changing market opportunities, dynamics coalition is a temporarily joined-up alliance of two or more leading enterprises in the fields like design, manufacture and distribution. It is the key mode for the 21st-century organizational modality and resource allocation.Allocation of profit refers to the profit shares that each member enterprise in the dynamic coalition obtains from the gross earnings. Rationally evaluating each's contribution and building up a just and fair allocation project is the key to a successful dynamic coalition, for such a coalition lays great stress on the cooperation among its members. Since each member is the entity of its own profits, it is necessary to address the profit allocation problem of uses the cooperative games theory. Based on combining fields of cooperative game and dynamic coalition, the profit allocation problem are studied here in depth.The followings are the main tasks of this study:Firstly, the dissertation estbalished a cooperative game model for the afterward allocation case, constructed its share values and then analyzed the effectiveness of those. Used some concepts from cooperative games like core, Shapley value and Kernel, the dissertation constructed the member enterprises' share values for the Transferable utility; while as for Nontransferable Utility, the dissertation gave marginal value as an allocation solution for member enterprises, testified its effectiveness and then testified that the marginal value were one of the core. It also exemplifies that the quantitative solution of the quantified marginal value actually were an extended Shapley-Shubik value in multi-dimensional spaces.Secondly, the dissertation estbalished a stochastic game model for the allocation-in-advance case, constructed its share values and then analyzed its effectiveness. The eigenfunction format is obtained firstly in the stochastic profit case, and then the beforehand allocation values (marginal value and transform value) are gained by virtue of two mathematical expressions of Shapley value. These two types of allocation values have been proved consistent, in the condition that every enterprise has the similar preference and posses linearly effective functions. What's more, these allocation values are viewed as an extension of Shapley-Shubik value in the stochastic profit. Another calculating example is given, too.Thirdly, a fuzzy cooperative game model is estbalished to study the uncertainty profit. The model takes advantage of the fuzzy number to measure the uncertainty profit and proposes the corresponding share values. The dissertation works out how to obtain fuzzy core and fuzzy Shapley value for transferable utility, and how to deal with the nontransferable utility. A way is achieved to distinguish the effectiveness of allocation and a calculating example is given, too.Fourthly, the dissertation estbalished a cooperative multi-choice game model for a multi-choice dynamic alliance, constructed its share values and then analyzed its effectiveness. As for the transferable utility, the model gives an average solution and compares it with the extended Shapley value; as for the nontransferable utility, the model calculates the Shapley consistent value and illustrates the solution procedure and its existent conditions.Finally, further analysis is put forward for the profit allocation that Enersys coalition adopts in the storage battery production by virtue of different types of share values constructed in this paper. The study gains some referential values for Enersys coalition in three occasions: allocation in advance, afterward allocation and multi-choice game. Meanwhile, the study offers some strategic suggestions on profit allocation for dynamic alliances.