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Alliance Formation And Benefit Distribution Of Cooperative Game Between Electrician Businessmen

Posted on:2017-02-09Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X L GuoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2209330488466906Subject:Computer application technology
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Electronic commerce was began in the 1970s.With the development of Internet technology, e-commerce is booming. Development up to now, e-commerce has changed the people’s consumption pattern which from the traditional entity shop into a consumer online. Merchant are pursuing a higher interest while Consumers seeking products or service of cheap and fine. The fundamental purpose which how to improve interest of merchant and how to distribute are solved.The background of this thesis is Coalition Games. We suggest that merchants form an alliance so that improve their interest and called this alliance as e-commerce coalition. We choose Shapley value to distribute earnings in coalition of merchants. The CTR(Click-Through Rate) is necessary for merchants when they are choosing website to sell products or services. In this paper, we assumption the websites charge a fee to merchants in term of CTR. We use VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism to structure payoff function, due to business negotiation and bidding have some similarities. But, in fact, The VCG mechanism does not meet our needs, we expand VCG mechanism as E-VCG((Expand VCG) mechanism and use E-VCG mechanism to structure payoff function of merchants in e-commerce coalition. We propose three rules to narrow down scope based on coalition games. We use shapley value to distribute the earnings in coalition. We proposed a method to calculate approximate shapley value, because of the actual value is very hard to gain.In general,the this thesis main research content contributions are as follows:1,We propose three rules to improve efficiency of coalition strategy that can make the whole of merchant coalition increased. Furthermore we prove the rule is reasonable.2, we expand the VCG mechanism and extract the mathematical expressions to reflect the relationship between spending and income of merchant’s, and prove this extension is reasonable.3, we put forward a method to calculate approximate shapley value, and we can get an approximation shapley value this in linear time.4, We get the merchants coalition strategy under we proposed rules, and make preliminary experiments to test the feasibility of our method.
Keywords/Search Tags:e-commerce coalition, The approximate Shapley value, E-VCG mechanism, coalition game
PDF Full Text Request
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