A Research On Evolutionary Rule Of Electronic Commerce Trust Risk

Electronic commerce, after years of development, has formed a huge potentialmarket and advanced technology platform. However, whether in the concept ofspeculation stage, or in the foam extrusion stage, or in the process of its rapiddevelopment, the electronic commerce did not achieve the expected value. Asignificant cause of this situation is that online shopping intentions of consumers havebeen restrained. E-commerce trust risk has become a bottleneck which restricting thedevelopment of electronic commerce in china. Therefore, it has important practicalsignificance that study focuses on the issues, which are related to electronic commercetrust risk.This paper firstly reviews the relevant literature about E-commerce trust riskfrom the formation, constitute elements, evaluation method and the prevention of risk.On this basis, the paper sums up demerits of current researches and proposes theperspective of this study, which is distrusted behavior of online trading groups. Thepaper focuses on studying Evolutionary Rule of E-Commerce Trust Risk. Secondly,we analyze the evolutionary characteristics of online trading group’s distrustedbehavior from the perspective of evolutionary game, combing evolutionary gametheory with its applicability to explain evolutionary game theory of online tradinggroup’s distrusted behavior. Thirdly, on the basis of literature research and theoreticalstatement, we raise a hypothesis based on the evolutionary game model betweenonline traders and regulators, then we establish equations that they are expected toreturn and gives solutions, and get the balanced state of both. Based on the abovesolution, we deploy dynamic analysis of the evolutionary game. Then multi Agentsimulation model is constructed, and we use the Netlogo software simulation to giveand analyze simulation results. On the basis of above, we conclude the enlightenmentsin management. Finally, we give summaries and research prospects.The results indicate that E-commerce trust risk is characterized by groupment.Online trading group has four traits: finite, repetitive, selectivity and reliability. Distrusted behavior of online trading groups accords with dynamic replicationprinciple what is formed by selectivity behaviors and evolutions. Taking a glance atthe evaluative process of E-commerce trust risk, the selectivity and varied behavior ofonline trading groups follow the principle of the saying-survival of the fittest. It hasselectivity rule and stability rule. At the same time, it is an adjustment and dynamicevolution process of group’s behavior. However, this evolutionary equilibrium needscertain conditions. We can conclude that E-commerce trust is unstable, which isnaturally formed in the ideal state (online traders are trustworthy, online regulatorsdon’t need supervision). But it is difficult to achieve in reality. The theoretical modeland the simulation results show that regulators need to strengthen supervision so as toformed good E-commerce trust. For one thing, they can take measures strengthen thesupervision to guide online trading behavior or increase penalty for distrusted trader.That can reduce the proportion of online distrusted traders group. For another, theyneed to reduce the cost of supervision, which can improve the economy and efficiencyof supervision and increase the proportion of the regulators who take regulatorystrategy.