Research On The Evaluation Mechanism Of C2C E-Commerce Courier Enterprises Based On Evolutionary Game

With the rapid development of economy and technology, e-commerce has become one of the essential consumption patterns, but the express delivery service, as an important complementary part of e-commerce develops slowly, which has become an serious bottleneck that restricting the development of e-commerce.Many scholars do the research from the perspective of service quality assessment in order to improve the quality of express delivery companies’ service. But the internal evaluation without external supervision for the express delivery quality of service is difficult to effectively promote the enterprises to improve service delivery.Therefore, based on the existing C2 C e-commerce credit evaluation model, this paper aims to establish a multi-party dynamic evaluation model from the perspective of the sellers and buyers of e-commerce.Based on the background above, this paper will be presented dynamic multi-party evaluation mechanism based on transactions and use the evolutionary game theory model which bounded rationality premised on the assumption to demonstrate and research the mechanism’s necessity and rationality.First of all, it discusses the background and significance of the research, summarizes the current related research status and describes the research methods and the content; the theoretical herein involved are described, identified the applications method of the theory for providing the theoretical basis and guidance for the full text.Then, the status quo for the slow development of e-commerce courier, in order to promote the express delivery companies to improve the quality of service efficiently, the paper analyzes the insufficient of C2 C e-commerce courier service evaluation model, it proposed that courier companies were evaluated based on the dynamic model of the transaction framework from the perspective of buyers and sellers, and analyzes the game between the seller, buyer, express delivery companies on the presence of the courier service.Thirdly, based on the bounded rationality, the paper research the evolutionary game relation between the seller and courier companies firstly, and the action policy choices theseller whether regulatory, courier companies whether compliance. To look up the stable equilibrium point of Game that when there is only seller to determine the delivery of behavior constraints, then added buyer feedback to the mechanism, which have an impact on the evolution of the original game’s payoff matrix, and ultimately affect the stability of equilibrium strategy change after the evolutionary game. Apply the MATLAB for numerical simulation of evolutionary game model to prove the correctness of evolutionary game model.Finally, analyzes the importance of the different effects of the parameters of the game and provides a reference for building the model, standard indicators, punishment and other standards.