Study On The Principal-agent Problem For The Enterprises In The Supply Chain Collaboration In China

With the increasingly fierce competition among enterprises, they graduallyrealize that they should focus on their comparative advantages, and remove theirdisadvantages by "outsourcing". The role of supply chain management is being highlyvalued by more and more enterprises. However, due to the imperfect informationbetween the members of the supply chain, there are problems such as "doublemarginalization", and "information asymmetry", which seriously puzzlethe enterprise managers, and hinder the enterprise’s development.This paper, taking CNPC Transportation Company Ltd as an example, shows thecurrent problems in supply chain management, the enterprise supply chaincollaboration, and agency relationship. The paper analyzes mainly on theprincipal-agent problems exposed in the process of actual production and putsforward some corresponding countermeasures. Research results of the paper are closeto the reality, valuable for the relevant decision makers in the practice.This paper focuses on the research on the principal-agent problem caused by“asymmetric information” in the supply chain collaboration. Chapter2introduces thetheoretical basis of this study, which are the supply chain theory and theprincipal-agent theory. Based on the case of CNPC Transportation Company Ltd, thepaper analyzes the company’s principal-agent problem existing in supply chainmanagement, namely "adverse selection" and "moral risk" problem. Chapter3interprets the problems by firstly introducing the characteristics of the principal-agentproblem in supply chain collaboration. Problems such as adverse selection,vehicle problems in purchasing and outsourcing, moral risk problems in packingprocess are analyzed by using the signal in the information economics, and based onthe strategy in the game model of the game theory. Chapter4puts forwardcountermeasures to solve the principal-agent problem in CNPC TransportationCompany Ltd and supply chain contract, and designs general countermeasures tosolve the principal-agent problem. The paper argues that enterprise should set upcorrect consciousness of risk prevention, using a variety of signal transmission mode,establishing an enterprise supply chain partnership, improving the supply chainagent access system, building supply chain risk agreement, and establishing restraintmechanism of supply chain strategy. Chapter5draws the conclusion.