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The Analysis Of Carriers' Supply Chain Construction By Virtue Of Principal-Agent Theory

Posted on:2010-10-28Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y N HuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360278965731Subject:Industrial Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Value-added business income has become one of the major sources for carriers in income growth, but now value-added service market still has a lot of problems: SP serious irregularities, an increase in user complaints and so on. If this situation goes on, it will be harmful for the development of the value-added business market.As to carriers, it is an important problem that builds an ideal value-added service supply chain.In the beginning, this paper applies the principal-agent theory into telecommunications value-added service supply chain, then analyzes the optimal incentive contract form from the principal-agent relationship between carrier and SP (carrier is a principal) so as to provide a series of thoughts for carriers on how to design incentive and restraint mechanisms, and put forward some Countermeasures and suggestions on how to solve the principal-agent problem.This paper is divided into seven chapters in total, Chapter I is the introduction on the background and significance of this topic, the main contents of this paper, research methods,ideas and potential innovations. Chapter II is a brief exposition on the principal-agent theory. Chapter III is a value-added service supply chain development of this industry,and briefly introduces the meaning of value-added services and its current situation, then discusses the current situation and its structure of value-added service supply chain. Chapter IV is a principal-agent relationship analysis of value-added service supply chain,which describes principal-agent problem and its causes among the other members from the perspective of carriers. Chapter V is based on the value-added service supply chain industry principal-agent model. By establishing simple principal-agent model between carrier and SP, we analyze the problem of optimal incentive contract. Chapter VI is the proposed measures on how to construct a good supply chain for carriers. From the usually-used methods to resolve principal-agent issues, together with model conclusions, we conclude how to solve the value-added service supply chain industry principal-agent problem, and put forward Countermeasures and suggestions on how to build an ideal carrier supply chain on the industry. At last, drawbacks and expectations in the paper are brought forward.
Keywords/Search Tags:carrier, value-added service, supply chain principal-agent
PDF Full Text Request
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