Research On Incentive And Restrictive Models Of Agent-construction Project Funded By Government Based On Incomplete Contract Theory

The government investment project is an important part of the whole social fixed assets investment, regional cultural, health, education work need support from government financial. Public investment in construction projects is crucial for the national economy and people’s lives, how to make effectively use of the limited government funds, ensure high quality and efficient of the public investment projects is to complete a major issue for government departments to be resolved. On July16,2004, the state council formally approved the <decision on reform of investment system>, and made the new agent management system model clearly, and quickly spread it all over the country. Construction agent system not only effectively solves the malpractice of function integration of investment, construction, supervision, using in the government projects, but also to a great extent, curb the three exceed phenomenon in government projects. With the implementation of agent-construction, we have made a lot of successful experience, however, because of the lack of mature theoretical basis and research, also have some problems in the practice. One problem is the incentive mechanism is not perfect in construction agent system projects.In the aspect of theoretical basis, first of all, this article introduces related concept and application of theory about project governance in construction agent projects and incomplete contract theory through consulting a large number of literatures. And then analyze characteristics of the contract in and discusses the contract incompleteness of construction agent projects and the principal-agent relationship of the contract parties. Finally in implementation level of construction agent system, in the aspect of the present generation situation and the management mode of construction agent system basis, this paper focus on the analysis of the policies related construction agent system incentive and constraints. And find the agent problems existing in the project implementation of incentive and constraints, as to provide theoretical basis for the subsequent model building.Based on the incomplete contract theory, on the basis of the GHM model, this paper sets up the government investment project agent model of incentive and constraints. Use the best configuration of residual control in construction agent projects as the breakthrough point, to study preliminary specificity investment incentive problems in advance of the parties to sign the contract in construction agent projects. Research results show that the agent contract party beforehand specificity investment mainly affected by three factors:the initial income distribution scheme specified in the contract, cooperation on both sides of the reputation factors, and the degree of risk preferences.