Research On Production And Coordination Decisions Of Closed-Loop Supply Chain With Costs Disruptions

As the deterioration of the earth’s environment and resource depletion, how to develop economy and to minimize the damage to the environment at the same time has become the consensus of all countries in the world. The important of closed-loop supply chain management has attracted growing attention from governments, businesses, and academic researchers. However, in practice, the performance of closed-loop supply chain is easily affected by disruptive events because of the relatively complex operation environment. Therefore, how to deal with and coordinate the production decisions of closed-loop supply chain under disruptions is the problem that managers must face. In this dissertation, the production decisions of closed-loop supply chain under disruptions in three different markets were studied based on non-cooperative game and program model.The main contents of this dissertation are as followed:1. The production decisions of closed-loop supply chain under costs disruptions in the bilateral monopoly were studied. Firstly, we discussed centralized and decentralized decisions of closed-loop supply chains in static scenario. Secondly, we contrasted the optimal production decisions of closed-loop supply chains in disruption scenarios. Finally, considering legal factor, we studied the decisions of closed-loop supply chains with return rate constraints when manufacturing costs are disrupted. The results indicate that the original pricing and production quantity decisions are relatively robust. The centralized decision maker, manufacturer, and retailer are found to benefit from adjusting their decisions when facing considerably negative disruptions. By contrast, the centralized decision maker and manufacturer also benefit, but the retailer does not benefit from adjusting decisions when facing considerably positive disruptions. In the case of law constraints, the optimal production strategy in closed-loop supply chain is different from the case without constraints.2. We studied the production and coordination decisions in a closed-loop supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers when remanufacturing costs are disrupted. Firstly, we discussed centralized and decentralized decisions of closed-loop supply chains in static scenario when retailers compete. Secondly, considering deviation costs, we studied the optimal production decisions of closed-loop supply chains in disruption scenario and the effect of retailer competition on decision making. Finally, we investigated how the closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing cost disruptions is coordinated by a revenue-sharing contract. We find that the pricing and production quantity decisions are relatively robust. The more intense the retailer competition is, the smaller the robustness regions. The closed-loop supply chain with or without disruptions can be coordinated via a revenue-sharing contract, whereas more profits are required by retailers under markedly positive disruptions.3. The production decisions in closed-loop supply chains consisting of two competing manufacturers and one retailer under multiple disruptions scenarios were studied. Firstly, we discussed the optimal production decisions of closed-loop supply chains in static scenario when manufacturers compete. Secondly, we built the closed-loop supply chain models in three remanufacturing costs disruptions scenarios. We also analyzed the effect of manufacturer competition and multiple disruptions on decision making. The theoretical basis for managers to make decisions was provided. The results indicate that the optimal selling price and production quantity under remanufacturing costs disruptions, the optimal return rate under competitor disruptions have some robustness. The optimal profit of manufacturer under both self and double disruptions, and the optimal profit of retailer in three remanufacturing costs disruptions scenarios are decreased with disruptions, while the optimal profit of manufacturer under competitor disruptions is increased with disruptions. We also find that one manufacturer under disruptions has most influence on production quantity and the profit of manufacturer, while two manufacturers under disruptions have most influence on price, return rate and retailer profits. The more intense the manufacturer competition is, the smaller the robustness regions.