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The Research Into The Governance Efficiency Of The Chinese Listed-companies Under The Control Of Large Shareholders

Posted on:2015-03-26Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:M L ZengFull Text:PDF
GTID:2309330431456011Subject:Applied Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In2005equity division reform started, basically completed by the end of2007.China’s equity market artificially fragmented situation has been changed, thestock market to achieve full circulation. Is the dominance of the state changed due tothe share reform or not? Is governance efficiency of the domestic listed companiesimproved? These problems need us to explore further.Governance efficiency is an important indicator of governance level of listedcompanies, but also by domestic scholars attention. Inefficient domestic governanceof listed companies is almost an accepted fact. Major shareholders play an importantrole in corporate governance, in close with the corpora te governance efficiency.Therefore, this paper explores governance efficiency after the share reform of listedcompanies controlled by large shareholders and its impact on governance efficiency.In the analysis of the board of directors and independent directors under controlfor the effective governance of listed companies, this paper uses the basic descriptivestatistics, paired sample test, DEA and panel data regression methods to measuregovernance efficiency and test the influence of major shareholde rs. In order tocompare the efficiency, this paper groups the selected sample first and then matcheson the basis of the control of the industry and the asset size, and ultimately gets themanufacturing for2006-2011listed companies with480balanced sample data.Thispaper measures the efficiency and tests the controlling shareholder on corporategovernance efficiency under the appropriate input and output indicators.Based on theoretical analysis and empirical testing, this paper gets the followingconclusions:(1) whether major shareholders or equity decentralized control of listedcompanies, the cost changes of governance between the two types are presented in thesame direction;(2) after the Share Reform,governance costs of the corporatecontrolled by major shareholder decreased and the major shareholder governance isefficient;(3) balance between equity and governance efficiency is negativerelationship. Finally, this paper proposes suggestings to improve the efficiency ofgovernance.
Keywords/Search Tags:controlling shareholder, double agent problem, governance mechanism, super-dea
PDF Full Text Request
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