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Cash Dividend Policy Of Chinese Listed Companies Controlling Shareholder Agency Problems

Posted on:2007-07-31Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Z H ChenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2209360185456417Subject:Quantitative Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Dividend policy has been a focus of the financial economics. Because of the huge difference of the degree of mature market and ownership structure, the Chinese dividend policy seems to be very special comparing western and mature market. Based on " the two powers separate" governance structure, the traditional dividend agency theory thinks that dividend can debase agency cost between manager and shareholder. In China, the capital market was cut up in to un-circulate and circulate field, and the listed company has high concentrated ownership structure. The core agent problem of the Chinese listed company is conflict between controlling shareholder and minority shareholder. The core agent problem provides the new angle of view to our research in cash dividend policy.Carrying on the foundation of the overview to the domestic and international concerning research about the agency problem, this paper detailed discusses conflict between controlling shareholder and minority shareholder in the Chinese listed company, and researches the influence of the core agency problem upon the cash dividend policy.This paper research is mainly divided into three parts: First, we analyze the relationship between the core agency problem and the cash dividend from the theories in the listed company. Combining the special ownership structure in Chinese listed-company, we analyze the reason of cash policy by controlling model. Because the degree of Separating control from cash flow right is low, and the return of controlling shareholder is more higher than minority shareholder, The absolutely controlling stockholder favor the cash dividend, the cash dividend become the measure of plunder wealth from the minority shareholder by the controlling shareholder. While the relative controlling shareholder doesn't please to pay the cash dividend, favor in letting the profit remain in the listed-company, because the cash dividend weaken controlling rights. In China, the stock market was cut up in to un-circulate and circulate field, the shareholder cannot buy and sold the un-circulate stocks, and the return of un-circulate...
Keywords/Search Tags:the core agent problem, control right and cash flow right, absolutely controlling shareholder, relative controlling shareholder, excessive control ownership structure, the divided stock market, cash dividend policy
PDF Full Text Request
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