The Research Of The Central Agency Problem And It's Governance For Listed Private Companies

The research emphasis of the corporate governance problem is the benefits conflictbetween shareholder and manager for a long time, which in the case of share scattering,indeed, is the center. To our Listed private companies, the shareholder is completely notabsence owner, and the benefits conflict not only lies in between shareholder andmanager, but also controlling shareholder and small shareholder, also controllingshareholder and its end client. Therefore, making valid restriction mainly constitutesgoverning our Listed Private Companies at present.This paper draws lessons from the SCP analysis type of the industrial organization,aiming at Listed private companies, through whose Equity Structure,behavior,resultstheory and empirical analysis, it aims at restricting shareholder's tunneling, and thenstudies the optimization and approach of Listed private companies governing structure,in order to form valid supervise to the actor of Listed Private Business, obtain the goodmarket performance, and provide supports for stock market good.The paper systematically analyses present conditions and governmentcharacteristic of our Listed private companies. From the angle of the finance results, it islower than non-Listed private companies, however, from market performance, it ishigher, so performance is obviously different in a differently listed way. Our Listedprivate companies formally established " separation of powers—balances" model, butdue to the influences of "the final-say as a big shareholder" expiration of controlling themarket and lack of the market withdrawal mechanism, it makes controlling shareholderto abuses the power, meanwhile, identity and self-interest right of the small shareholdersnearly to be deprived. Commencing on central agency problem, it analyzes theformation mechanism, explaining origins and factors that controlling shareholdercorrodes small shareholders and listed company benefits in our Listed privatecompanies;at the same time, it analyzes the influence of untradeble share andseparation degree of control rights and cash flow rights on central agency problem.According to means of benefits occupation, it analyzes shareholder behavior of thelisted company, joining together what our listed companies have exposed in recent years.The big shareholders transfer the resources from the listed company through theconnection trade for the sake of the self interest, including the property sale, transfer ofthe list price, the debt guarantee, deprivation of company opportunity, even occupationetc;Another method is increasing shares of controlling shareholders under the situationof big shareholders not transferring any property, such as the trade the internal person,secretly booking etc.The paper analyses the impact of the internal and external governance on behaviorsof the controlling shareholders, namely the validity of external supervision;It analysesthe effectiveness that equity restriction and independent directors restrict tunneling ofcontrolling shareholders. Unified with central agency problem, it also analyses thepresent situation of stockholder's rights structure, the behavior, the performance;andproposes hypothesis, then carries on it based on public data from the listed privatecompanies.The paper proposes policies and recommendations to solve the central agentproblem, whose formation mechanism acting as a breakthrough on the basis of thetheoretical and empirical analysis. Reforming the vote style, expanding the scope ofaccumulative ballot system, improving exercise way of voting right and carrying outavoidance system enhance inner shareholders equity forces, thereby reduce tunneling ofcontrolling shareholders;Enhancing faith obligation of controlling stockholders as innerrestraints, enhancing external administrative market and law restraints, consummatingultimate controllers disclosure of information system of listed companies, strengtheningsupervision to companies with a high degree of separation of control rights and cashflow rights, perfecting tunneling of controlling shareholders;Regulating the disclosureof information, increasing market warning system, setting up shareholder derivativelitigation system and introducing civil compensation increase tunneling costs, reducethe incentive for violations, thereby address central agency problem in order to restrictcontrolling shareholders tunnelling and protect the interests of small shareholders.