Pyramid Holding Structure Controlling Shareholder Of Agent Research

Agency problem is one of the kernal problems that corporate governance is concerned about, and many scholars still put great emphasis on the agency problem between owners and managers under dispersed shareholding model. However,since the middle 1990s, the research focus of corporate governance has shifted from England and America to New Industrial Economy, Transitional Economy and the continental countries in Europe, and scholars find that the shareholding in many countries is very concentrated. So, another agency problem, that is the agency problem between controlling shareholders and the middle-small shareholders called controlling shareholder agency problem for short, begins to become the researchers' concern..The research on controlling shareholder agency problem shows that stock pyramids are the main tool by which the controlling shareholder separates cash flow rights and control rights, and then misappropriate the benefits of middle-small shareholders. China is a transitional country and the capital market has developed for over 10 years since Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange were founded , and the stock pyramids have come into being, such as Delong Group and Gelinkeer Group. Therefore,it is necessary for us to make an analysis of the controlling shareholder agency problem theoretically and practically so as to give reasonable advice to middle-small shareholders.According to what has been mentioned above, this thesis is divided into 6 parts as follows:The first part is the introduction, including the background and significance of the issue put forward.The second part is the literature review of the relative controlling shareholder agency problems, which foreshadows the analysis of the entire thesis.