Research On The Game Between Central Government And Local Government About The Land Policy

With the rapid development of China’s economy, land supply and demand becomemore prominent, people and land conflicts are more acute. A limited amount of urbanland supply is more difficult to solve the above-mentioned problems, and localgovernments in order to obtain performance, accelerate the construction, increaserevenue, secretly change the nature of land, a serious breach of the centralmacro-control goals. Therefore, the central land policy ever enacted to strengthenmacro-control efforts to protect the people’s livelihood, to achieve the desired controlobjectives. However, due to land regulation nationwide rely solely on the centralgovernment, the Central difficult practical implementation, the effect of policyimplementation can be said to a large extent depends on the place, because the latter issingle-handedly the actual work of the region’s land, expropriated. This makes itdifficult for the central government’s land policy to play to protect farmland and foodsecurity, safeguard the interests of farmers, etc., adding to the game on the land interestsof the central government and local government.This paper has carried on the analysis to the central government and localgovernment in the interests of the game between the land, including the existence inrecent years, the national land and resources use of illegal land use status; three realisticconditions of central and local government land policy game: The central governmentand local government, serious conflicts and contradictions between the centralgovernment and local government in land targets is the property right of localgovernment have asymmetric informationgame, not equal; the four main reasons forland policy failure: Land fiscal stimulus of local financial growth, land double tracksystem,the land market problems and weak supervision of land policy. This paper is toestablish a win-win game of central and local governments—incentive compatiblemechanism. Incentive compatible mechanism can effectively solve their regularitiesoccur repeatedly, supervision department staff burnout and monopoly marketinefficiency. Construction of the central government the optimal incentive contract, sothat local governments maximize follow the central policy,make optimal choice,toimplement the central macro-control objectives.This paper adopts case analysis method, promulgated on since2011on theimplementation of the implementation of the policy effect on illegal land use cases openbulletin in detail. According to the analysis of above theory, by constructing aprincipal-agent model to achieve the distribution of interest game between central andlocal government, the paper possible innovative points at the same time, to betterimplement the national macro-control policies.