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The Research Of Land Finance Between The Local Government And Central Government Based On The Game Theory

Posted on:2013-08-18Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:S F ZhangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2249330377961276Subject:Administrative Management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years, the land finance problem has become a hot social concern. Land financeis the behavior that local government receives huge income via land-user granting. Over theyears, In order to develop the local economy, enhance the financial strength, improve localGDP and access to the personal political advancement opportunities, local governments trytheir best to obtain land-transferring fees and other correlative charges. So far, the Chineselocal government land revenue has more than half of its total fiscal revenue, local governmentis increasingly dependent on land-transferring income.However, the growing phenomenon of land finance led to and exacerbated a series ofcontradictions and problems such as force devictions, rising housing prices,corruption, landacquisition disputes and the increase in mass incidents, this is not only a direct threat to therationality and sustainable use of the land, also affect the social stability and scientificdevelopment and greatly reduce the effectiveness of the central regulation of land. Therefore,how to crack the plight between the local and central government under the current landfinancial has become a major issue to be studied and resolved.In this paper, based on the game theory and through the systematic inspection on China’scurrent land financial situation,author profoundly analyze the local and central governmentfiscal relations, conflicts of interest, the interests of the game, especially the game behavior inthe regulation of land to explore the causes of land finance, which contains that the currentimperfect financial and taxation system, the defective land management, inadequate laws andregulations, less strict enforcement of land, unscientific evaluation mechanism, imperfectsupervision and accountability.In view of this, the paper attempts to establish a more scientific land regulation gamemodel between the local government and central government, and put forwardcountermeasures and suggestions to crack a series of land regulation game dilemma, that is, toreform the fiscal and taxation system, unify financial authority and powers; to sound budgetmanagement and improve transfer payments; to regulate the financing channels andinnovative land management; to define of "public interest" and constrained land acquisitionact; to improve laws and regulations and adhere to manage the land by law; to make theadministrative action strictly by law and enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement; tostrengthen land monitoring and implement the accountability mechanism. Only in this way can out of the plight of the current regulation of land.
Keywords/Search Tags:land finance, local government, central government, game, regulation
PDF Full Text Request
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