Research On The Dynamic Mechanism Of City Government Environmental Governance

Since the eighteenth congress of the Communist Party of China has put forward the construction of ecological civilization, environmental governance issues has been paid more and more attention by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, however, the development practice in many cities of China is still in the old way of "pollution first, treatment later‖, the economic development of the city paid huge environmental price, the contradiction between economic development and environmental protection has become increasingly prominent. The city government has made a tremendous contribution to the economic development of our country,at the same time, it should be responsible for the city environmental problems. At present, the city government in China has shown a lack of power in environmental governance, which is not conducive to the sustainable development of the city. To this end, the study of urban environmental governance has a certain theoretical and practical significance.The theory of public goods, it’s the own job of the government to provide public goods to the community. Environment, as a kind of public goods with non – competitive in consumption and non- exclusive in benefit, its main supply body must be the government. Public choice theory believes that the government is the rational "economic man", with the tendency of maximizing their own interests, in the action of choice,it will carry out cost-income calculation and choose the actions in line with the maximization of their own interests. Based on this, only to start from the dynamic mechanism, can solve the low power problem of city government environmental governance fundamentally.Taking Jinan as an example, visited in the survey found that the specific performance of the city government’s lack of incentive in environmental governance: the city government has the tendency of heavy economic and light environmental protection, the city government’s investment in environment governance is relative insufficiency, the nonfeasance in city government environmental governance, and the poor implement efficiency in government environmental target responsibility system. To this end, it is necessary to systematically analyze the institutional reasons for the lack of power of city government environmental governance in the two aspects of incentive and accountability. On the one hand, there exist institutional defects in incentive mechanism of city government environmental governance as follows: GDP as the core of the "tension-type" political incentive model, the financial authority and business division of longitudinal intergovernmental is not reasonable, another the raise of government environmental governance efficiency is not big enough to influence the promotion of officials. On the other hand, the accountability mechanism of city government environmental governance does not play a proper role, as follows: the subject of government environmental accountability is too single, vague object, and the lack of specification of the government accountability officials return to the office. It can be said, it is precisely the design flaws of the incentive and accountability mechanism of the current city government environmental governance, that result in the lack of "attraction" and "thrust" in the process of city government environmental governance, and then affects the power of city government environmental management.In view of this, based on the experience of the American New York Hudson River water environmental governance and the United Kingdom London haze governance, trying to from the two aspects of incentive and accountability to provide feasible countermeasures to improve government environmental governance power. On the one hand, improve the city environmental governance incentive mechanism, that is, to improve the local government performance evaluation system, increase the proportion of environmental assessment, reasonable division of local government financial authority and business, constructing effective financial incentive mechanism. And constructing incentive mechanism of government officials’ environmental governance performance. On the other hand, improve the city environmental governance accountability mechanism, such as to broaden subject of the city government environmental accountability, clear object of the city government environmental accountability, implementation of urban government environmental governance lifelong accountability, and also, refine the return back mechanism of city government environmental accountable officials. Only from the two aspects of incentive and accountability, "two pronged", can effectively improve the power of environmental governance of city government.