Research On The Incentive Mechanism Of Rural Doctor In The New Medical Reform

The Party Central Committee and the State Council state department made an important decision that to begin New Medical Reform in 2009.To build the country medical care service system We need focus on the country health service net work which is base on the country hospital、township hospital and village clinics. This is an signal that the government will pay more attention to the development of the countryside medical and health. The community who work in village clinics and provide the premier medical health service to rural residents is rural doctors. There are so many questions after The New Healthcare Reform,such as more much work、lower income、no Old-Age Security、aging、invalid tracing.This research firstly analysis the current question about the village doctors face by document research and analyzing the data and policy from Health Planning Commission.Base on the stakeholder theory 、 Potter-Loale integrated motivational models 、 social exchange theory, I study the incentive mechanism of rural doctors in the jiulongpo District(pilot district of China’s rural health development project) form policy of government 、 incentive process form rural township hospital and the exchange relationship between rural doctors and rural residents. Through the quantitative analysis and case study, the experience are drawed:(1)On the policy level, transform the identity of village doctor or realize equal pay for equal work to improve the motivation of village doctors, and solve the problem of old-age security, what’s more, innovate talent-training model to improve the ability of rural doctors.(2) the management level:through the team management, performance appraisal system and assessment commented on the ground of the practice of integrated management. As a result,it greatly improve the internal and external incentive satisfaction of rural doctors and regulate the behavior of its services and improve the villagers satisfaction of basic public health services;(3) On individual level: rural doctors should take advantage of its localization to relies the exchange of high quality services and social identity. The incentive mechanism of Jiulongpo district plays a positive effect,but there are also some problems, such as public villagers can’t choose the health services provided by the villagers do not have the option, this restrict the rural doctors service enthusiasm,the learning will of old village doctor is so low, and the performance appraisal system still needs further improvement. Through the above theoretical and empirical analysis,this paper establishes “system level- management level- individual level” incentive mechanism of rural doctors as the core of multidimensional incentive mechanism. first of all, on system level, strengthen the system level design, such as identity of rural doctors, old-age security system, strengthen the financial compensation for rural doctors as well as to the allocation of capital supervision, strengthen the guide of public opinion,to improve the village doctor of the medical environment; On management level, make the incentive environment better, and make personnel-adjust training to the rural doctor and let them learn about their own role; On individual level, rural doctors should understand of their role in the new reform correctly and take the advantages of "localization", to promote the social exchange between rural doctors and villagers on the background of low level medical skill.