A Study On Interest Equilibrium Game Between Taxes

Tax is the key for the development of national economy and a large proportion of thefiscal revenue is acquired from tax collection. Through the analysis of several tax reforms andtax law amendments, we can find the government’s effort on many aspects, such as the taxcollection, the fiscal revenue distribution, the optimization of resource allocation, thepopularization of tax knowledge an the enhancement of taxpayer compliance etc. On the otherhand, the taxpayers who complied with the tax policy are gradually involved the study of taxsystem and tax laws. Those taxpayers keep a lose attention to the tax reform, they may followthe tax system or “exploit an advantage” of the loophole of the tax system, so conflict existsbetween the taxpayer and the tax collector. As the continuous development and reform of thesociety, game-based idea was widely applied in the actual social life. The emergence of taxgame represented the existence of contradiction between the tax collector and the taxpayer,and the contradiction between tax collection and tax evasion, which are contradictions of bothparties for their own target and benefits.In the paper, the author mainly introduced the relevant theories about game theory and taxgame and briefly listed the game methods of both parties. Through the tax-collecting model,the author analyzed the game, so as to reveal the optimal combination scheme for both partiesand confirm the optimal probability of the tax authority’s audit. Meanwhile, from theperspective of the precondition and assumption of game analysis, and the actual situation, theauthor proposed a tax management strategy with high operability that can be applied to theactual tax management. Based on the current reform of tax system in China, the authorproposed the idea of carrying out law-based tax administration. Besides, for the restrictive roleof laws in tax collecting game, the author proposed suggestions to maximize the benefits ofboth parties conform to the law principles and obtain the optimal solution for tax collection.