Research On Congestion Pricing Revenue Redistribution Based On The Difference Of Time Value

With the development of economic and urbanization, urban population and vehicle possessing has been increase rapidly. The problem of traffic congestion has become an urgent problem to be solved in each big city. Theory and practice present that congestion pricing can effectively alleviate the traffic congestion. And congestion pricing revenue redistribution has become the key point of whether congestion pricing strategy can be implemented efficiently. Based on theories of economics and traffic engineering, game theory, this thesis probed into the revenue redistribution for different value of time between travelers under the road congestion pricing. Quantitatively demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the redistribution policy which provide theoretical reference for the implementation of congestion pricing policy.Firstly, this thesis defines the concept of congestion pricing, and defines the property of congestion pricing revenue redistribution. And based on related theories of economics, the relationship between congestion pricing and congestion pricing revenue is analyzed. At the same time, this thesis suggests "Give priority to equity with due consideration to efficiency" as the principle for urban road congestion pricing revenue redistribution. Also the mode of congestion pricing revenue redistribution is discussed according to the requirement of the principle of urban road congestion pricing revenue redistribution. Through the above analysis lays a theoretical foundation for establishing congestion pricing revenue redistribution model.Secondly, analyze the impact of congestion pricing on the welfare of different types of travelers by the welfare economics. By measuring the change of travel cost before and after congestion pricing, a model to measure the impact of congestion pricing on the welfare of travelers was built. In order to measure the welfare loss, the specific parameters such as value of time, travel time are discussed. Then according to the welfare redistribution to achieve the purpose of Pareto improvement.Thirdly, based on the premise that the time of value is distinct between different travelers, each traveler chooses to maximize his own benefit. After the complete information static game, the equilibrium is reached. In this thesis, the equilibrium is described when the congestion pricing is not implemented, congestion pricing and congestion pricing revenue redistribution is implemented. Meanwhile, a corresponding model is established. And according to the characteristics of the equilibrium, the iterative algorithm is designed to solve the problem.Lastly, the feasibility of the proposed model and algorithm is verified by designing a simple road network. And the result of the calculation shows that the social welfare is improved after the congestion pricing. But the welfare of travelers in transferred traffic volume is reduced. Through congestion pricing revenue redistribution, not only the welfare losses of these travelers will be compensated, but also remain the improvement of benefit.