Electronic Products Reverse Supply Chain, The Agent Incentive Contract Design

China is the world’s second largest e-waste producing country except the U.S. But only a small part of the e-waste could be recycled, the electronic products recycling will help to improve the resource utilization, the environmental protection and the human health,"e-waste Waste electrical and electronic product recycling regulations" was come into effect on January1,2011The e-waste implements multi-channel recovery and centralized processing,the producers of electrical and electronic products are encouraged to recovery e-waste by themselves or the seller, the maintenance organization, the service agency and e-waste recycling operators.In this context, the article applied principal-agent theory, on the basis of the existing literature,The writer study how to encourage re-manufacturers-recycling, government-re-manufacturers, designed and compared different contracts.the main content as followes:(1) The article analyzed the principal-agent relationship between re-manufacturers and recyclers in the reverse supply chain.Because of asymmetric information,both moral hazard and adverse selection are existed, using the principle-agent theory, the linear pooling contract and the linear screening contract are studied in a two-level reverse supply chain with asymmetric information. The influence of various factors on these contracts are analyzed as well, especially the utilization ratio of the recycling of electronic products. The effects of certain parameters on the profit of the remanufacturer are also illustrated with a numerical simulation. The linear screening contract could be effectively distinguish the ability of recyclers. The profit of the remanufacturer adopting linear screening contract is generally greater than that adopting linear pooling contract. The utilization ratio of the recycling of electronic products has no effect on the motivation coefficient, but it affects the fixed remuneration. The conclusion in the paper is valuable and significant to the operation in the reverse supply chain(2) The article also analyzed the principal-agent relationship between government and re-manufacturers. Because of asymmetric information, both moral hazard and adverse selection are existed.using the principle-agent theory under asymmetric information,the writer designed four incentive contracts, as follows:the deposit contract, incentive contract, penal contract and rewards and punishments contract. The government’s expected profit will be maximum. Under rewards and punishments contract.The paper discussed the impact factors of the government’s expected profit by numerical simulation.the company’s effort level and agency costs were analyzed.All the four contracts could improve the effort level of the re-manufacturer.the manufacturer’s effort level is inversely proportional to its cost.the government oversight on the manufacturer were studied.when the environmental benefits is twice that of the Remanufacturing benefits, The remanufacturer’s benefits is small,the government needs to strengthen oversight.at last,a number of Suggestions were made for government reference.Finally, it summarizes the research, Points out the main innovation in the research and sheds light on the futurer research in the relevant field.