The Research Of Incentive Mechanism To Supply Chain Finance Operation Mode Based On Principal-agent Theory

Supply chain management has been centralized on logistics and information level by the end of the20th century, the supply chain overall financing costs caused by global outsourcing activities, making the supply chain logistics management concept gradually changing to the financial supply chain management which is the supply chain financial concept. As a mode of financial innovation, supply chain finance have given full play to the advantages of financial institutions, logistics companies, as well as the supply chain upstream and downstream enterprises, from the perspective of the whole industrial chain, it not only resolve the difficult problem of SME financing, but also reduce market risk, adjust the credit structure of the bank, driving the development of the logistics enterprises, improve the competitiveness of the entire supply chain. However, supply chain companies as an independent body, in order to pursue their own maximize goals, information asymmetry have been exacerbated, which cause a variety of principal-agent relationship, in order to improve supply chain performance, the principal-agent the theory is introduced to the supply chain finance research. In this paper, under the premise of the three basic operation mode of supply chain finance, we introduce the principal-agent theory, through a contract between the parties involved in the supply chain finance (including banks, the core business, small and medium-sized enterprises, third-party logistics) attributed to principal-agent incentive contracts, and then designing incentives, and weakening moral hazard, then selecting the optimal level of effort to agent to making the client’s income utility maximized.