Research On Incentive Mechanism And Game Strategy Of "Cooperation Between Banks And B2B E-commerce Platforms" In Supply Chain Finance

In the context of the continuous transformation and upgrading of the domestic economy,the difficulty of financing is particularly prominent for small and medium-sized enterprises,and the traditional supply chain financial model has been unable to meet the market development.In recent years.Internet finance with the goal of "inclusive finance" has developed rapidly,among which the online supply chain finance model based on bank and B2B e-commerce platform has become an important grasp to solve this problem.However,according to market practice,the cooperative relationship between banks and B2B e-commerce platforms is extremely unstable.How to design the incentive mechanism between them and analyze their game strategies are of great significance for stabilizing their cooperative relationship and achieving win-win situation.This paper applies the principal-agent theory.incentive theory and game theory in economics and management.Firstly,it studies the related research on supply chain finance at home and abroad through the literature research method,and introduces the traditional supply chain finance and online supply chain finance respectively,and compares the formal and essential differences between traditional supply chain finance and online supply chain finance,draws the unique advantages of online supply chain finance.Then,based on this,two financing modes of bank and B2B e-commerce platform adopting joint credit and entrusted credit are constructed,and a two-way moral model of Cooperation between banks and B2B e-commerce platforms under joint credit and a one-way moral model under entrusted credit are established.The optimal contracts of the two modes are obtained by solving the model.The results show that the optimal allocation ratio of banks in both modes is the Pareto optimal solution,and reveals that when the interest rate,pledge rate and smoothness meet certain conditions,the reason why Cooperation between banks and B2B e-commerce platforms will be transferred from joint credit to entrusted credit is explained.And the impact of parameter changes such as loan interest rate,pledge rate,smoothness,and e-commerce platform penalty coefficient on the optimal effort level and optimal distribution ratio,and computer simulations confirmed that the influence of parameter changes on the two modes is consistent with the model conclusion.Finally,through the establishment of benefit matrix to analyze the optimal game strategies of banks and B2B e-commerce platforms under different conditions,and the conditions for the existence of Nash equilibrium in the game strategies of B2B e-commerce platforms when faced with low-credit enterprises and high-credit enterprises.At the same time,the reasons for the breakdown of the relationship between bank and electricity are explained and the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are given.This paper applies principal-agent theory,incentive theory and game theory in economics and management Firstly,through the literature research method,it sorts out related researches on supply chain finance at home and abroad,analyzes and compares three typical models of traditional supply chain finance and online supply chain finance,and then builds a bank and B2B e-commerce platform based on this.Two credit financing modes of joint credit and entrusted credit,and a two-way moral model of Cooperation between banks and B2B e-commerce platforms under joint credit and a one-way moral model under entrusted credit are established.The results show that the optimal allocation ratio of banks under both modes is the Pareto optimal solution.At the same time,it reveals that when the interest rate,pledge rate and smoothness meet certain conditions,the Cooperation between banks and B2B e-commerce platforms will be transferred from the joint credit to the entrusted credit,and the computer simulation is used to confirm the parameter change for the two modes’ conclusion of the impact of the results.Finally,through the establishment of the benefit matrix to analyze the two-party game strategy,the reasons for the breakdown of the Cooperation between banks and B2B e-commerce platforms relationship are explained.Throughout the full text this paper mainly studies the online supply chain finance of "banking-electricity cooperation" in the form of quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis,and tries to give scientific basis for the incentive mechanism and game strategy between banks and third-party B2B e-commerce platforms,and give a theoretical explanation for the instability of their cooperation relationship,so as to provide guidance for the healthy development of online supply chain finance in the future.