Research On Risk Prevention And Countermeasure In The Government Procurement Based On Behavior Of Rent-Seeking

China was officially launched to join the negotiations of the WTO Agreementon Government Procurement on December28,2007. This action of our countryindicates that our government procurement market has been opened up to the world,followed by the international conventions and obligations of the governmentprocurement that should be strictly abided by and executed. Currently, the risk ofrent-seeking behavior of our government procurement is restricting the healthydevelopment of the government procurement and brings huge resistance for theinternationalization of the government procurement. Therefore, lucubrating the riskof the rent-seeking behavior of the government procurement and the precautions isno time to delay.The object studied in this article is the risk of rent-seeking behavior ofgovernment procurement and through researching the manifestation of it, we find themain cause of it. Through establishing the dynamic game model to quantitativelyanalyze the reason how the rent-seeking behavior of the government procurementappears as well as the game relations among each main part. Besides, through thequantitative analysis of the dynamic model and using the backward induction to getthe expected benefits of the game subject, then summarize each factor that affects therent-seeking behavior of the government procurement. Chapter one is a generaldiscussion of the reason for choosing this question．Chapter two introduced thecurrent state of the behavior government procurement in our country as well as thebehavior of rent-seeking． Chapter three analyzed the relationship of thegovernment，the buyers for the government and the sellers，based on the gametheory．Chapter four is the verification for the game analysis in chapter three.Chapter five proposed the precautions for the rent-seeking behavior of thegovernment procurement.The object studied in this article analyzes the causes and approaches of rent-seeking on government procurement through two typical cases, especially the gamebehavior of government procurement based on the interests of all parties. Based on this study, we propose the precautions for the rent-seeking behavior of thegovernment procurement, and simultaneously, present the relative policies indeepening the revolution of the government procurement system of our country.