The Selective And Comparison Study Of RJV And R&D Under The Condition Of Government Subsidies

Today, with the speeding up of the process of economic globalization, competitions among enterprises become more and more intense. The key factor that determines whether an enterprise can gain core competitiveness is its technological innovative ability. Under such a background, RJV and R&D, these two kinds of innovative researching and developing modes are now undergoing fast development in the developed countries and the governments also generally make use of the tools such as subsidies to promote the enterprises to set up RJV or to carry out R&D activities.At first, this thesis made a theoretical review of RJV and R&D, looked back the previous researching achievements about these two researching and developing modes made by other scholars and experts and then had a clear idea about their developing path so as to lay down a sound theoretic basis for the following analysis. Then, the thesis made a comparison of the developing paths of RJVs influenced by different policies in different countries and introduced the current development of RJVs and the related policies in the U.S., Japan and EU respectively. Thirdly, this thesis made a model analysis based on the duopoly game model put forward by Von Vilasuso and Mark R Frascatore. Based on this model, we could deduce four patterns, namely R&D competition, R&D cartel, RJV competition and RJV cartel and then analyzed the effectiveness of RJV and R&D with government subsidies in these four patterns. After the model analysis, we combined the models with the realities of the enterprises in our country and chose the Unis Measurement and Control Company, a research and production enterprise in China BinHai New District, as an example to analyze the practical applications of the models. At the end of the thesis, we made some specific suggestions to the future development of China’s RJVs.