| Since the 19th National Congress of the Party,the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping has attached great importance to innovation,and placed innovation at the forefront of new development concepts,vigorously implemented innovation-driven development strategies,and achieved fruitful results in the construction of an innovative country with a large number of major scientific and technological achievements.In the process of implementing innovation,it is necessary to increase investment in R&D.The effective method is collaborative innovation to make use of limited investment.However,R&D has certain risks during collaborative innovation.Therefore,when R&D companies carry out innovation,they will consider the issue of innovation costs,that is,whether the innovation costs are borne by the production enterprises or the R&D enterprises?Or jointly undertaken through a contract?This is a key issue facing collaborative innovation.At the same time,the government adopts a subsidy strategy to promote enterprise innovation,but there is a big controversy against government subsidies.The focus of the dispute is whether the subsidy is to R&D companies or production companies?Because the effects of subsidies are different.In view of this,based on the existing research,this paper conducts the game model of R&D enterprises and production enterprises based on two modes of R&D(one is that only the R&D enterprise is responsible for R&D,and the other is that both the R&D enterprise and the production company are responsible for R&D at the same time),and analyzes the impact of different government subsidies on collaborative innovation,and the impact of different R&D cost bearer models on collaborative innovation.Further,the upstream and downstream collaborative innovation contracts are analyzed in order to achieve upstream and downstream collaborative innovation.The main research results are as follows:First of all,a game model is constructed with government-subsidized R&D enterprises and production enterprises when there is R&D of only R&D enterprise.Based on this model,the impact of different subsidy strategies selected by the government on collaborative innovation is analyzed to establish the government's optimal subsidy target.Further,based on the impact of different R&D cost commitment models on collaborative innovation,a coordination mechanism to achieve upstream and downstream collaborative innovation is given.The research results show that:government subsidies can effectively promote innovation,and different government subsidies have the same effect on government subsidies on innovation;when consumers' sensitivity to innovation is less than a certain threshold,government subsidies can reduce the retail price of unit products,and the government The selection of different subsidy targets has the same effect on the retail price of unit products;when centralized decision-making,the R&D effort is the largest,that is,the innovation enthusiasm is the highest,the R&D effort is the second when the production company bears the R&D cost,and the R&D effort is the smallest when the R&D company bears the R&D cost;When the production enterprise bears the R&D expenses,the enterprise indirectly bears part of the risks of innovation and R&D,so that the R&D enterprise's enthusiasm for innovation and R&D is improved,and ultimately its R&D efforts are improved;when the R&D enterprise bears the R&D expenses,the R&D enterprise not only bears the risk of R&D.It also bears the risk of investing in R&D expenses.These two factors have contributed to the reduction of its efforts.When the R&D enterprise bears the R&D expenses,the R&D enterprise will increase its income by increasing the unit product R&D cost in order to make up for the R&D investment.That is,when the R&D enterprise bears the R&D expense,the unit entrusts the R&D expense to be the largest.The cost-sharing contract cannot achieve the overall optimal R&D and production,and the cost-sharing contract that constrains the R&D costs can achieve the overall optimal revenue.Secondly,when R&D enterprises and production enterprises conduct R&D at the same time,a game model of upstream and downstream collaborative innovation composed of a R&D enterprise and a production enterprise is constructed.We analyze the impact of different government subsidy strategies on upstream and downstream R&D,and study the coordination and innovation mechanism of upstream and downstream in order to achieve the optimal joint R&D.The results of the study show that government subsidies can effectively promote upstream and downstream collaborative innovation and increase the efforts of upstream and downstream innovation.However,the government different subsidies have the same effect on innovation efforts,product sales,and revenue.It is just that the government selects different subsidies to affect the unit product commissioned R&D expenses and unit product retail prices.In the decentralized decision-making,the unit product commissioned R&D cost is inversely related to the innovation effort cost coefficient,and the innovation cost factor of the R&D enterprise has little effect on the unit product commissioned R&D expense,and the production enterprise innovation effort cost coefficient has a significant effect on the unit product commissioned R&D.The retail price of a unit product is less than the retail price of a unit product when a centralized decision is made.The product sales volume is greater than the product sales when a centralized decision is made.The innovation effort is greater than the innovation effort when a centralized decision is made.The sum of benefits when making decisions.When an R&D enterprise innovates,it will transfer its R&D costs by increasing the commissioned R&D expenses of the unit product;the retail price of the unit product is positively related to the degree of innovation effort of the unit product,and the product demand is positively related to the degree of innovation effort of the unit R&D enterprise.Finally,in order to analyze the impact of time changes on upstream and downstream collaborative innovation,a differential game model of R&D and production enterprises is constructed based on different government subsidy strategies to obtain time functions of decision variables and returns of R&D and production enterprises,and get the impact of decision-making and decentralized decision-making models on the R&D efforts and returns.The results of the study indicate that government subsidies make the system stability larger and the innovation effort degree stability larger,which is conducive to innovation.On the other hand,government subsidies can help reduce the commissioned R&D expenses per unit product.Since the commissioned R&D expenses per unit product are reduced,the retail price of the unit product is indirectly lowered.The lowered retail price of the unit can promote consumers'enthusiasm for purchasing products and increase product sales.At the same time,government subsidies can effectively promote production enterprises' innovation efforts.In centralized decision-making,the retail price of unit products is less than that in decentralized decisions,and the retail price of unit products in decentralized decisions is significantly greater than that in centralized decisions.The general trend of time on the unit retail price of products is consistent,all in the early stages.Affect the unit retail price of products,and then reach equilibrium.However,when centralized decision-making,the sales volume of the product is the largest,and it is obviously larger than the sales volume during the decentralized decision-making,and the time does not change the product sales volume significantly. |
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