Game Analysis Of Cooperative R&D For Supply Chain Based On Incentives Inside Chain、Venture Capital And Government Subsidies

On macroscopical, technology innovation play a decisive role in developing acountry or a region’s economy、strengthen military and heighten international status,it is source power to a country or region’s sustainable development. For theenterprises which are the cells of social economy, technology innovation is powersource to keep their competitive advantage. Technological innovation which studies inthis paper is from the enterprises’ perspectives, but the high risk、long investmentcycle and large capital investment troubled many enterprises in technologicalinnovation, while the more intense market competition compels enterprises to set footin the innovation activities, so the technological research joint venture(RJV) emergeas the time requires, first they can share the R&D risk、allocate R&D investment,second can make the technology spillover internally. This paper in the light of thecooperative in R&D of RJV, researches the decision problem between the participantsbased on incentives inside the chain, venture capital and government subsidies, usesthe game theory to analysis the game relationship between participants, obtain everyparticipant’s optimal decision value in each case. This paper consists of 6 chapters, themain contents and conclusions are as follows:Chapter 1, introduces the research background, significance, aim and method, researchthought and innovation points and article structure.Chapter 2, summarizes the domestic and foreign literatures about the technologyinnovation of the enterprises. First list researches which introduced the connotation oftechnology innovation, then list related researches which introduced technologyinnovation of the enterprises based on incentives inside the chain、venture capitaland government intervention, and the connotation of the venture capital, and cardingthe related literatures about the control rights、equity allocation and transfer in theventure firms, capital structure of the venture firms, double moral hazard andincentive contract design in the venture capital, pave the way for the construction ofmodels in this paper.Chapter 3, constructs two suppliers cooperative R&D internal subsidy modelbased on technology spillovers in three different cooperative mode of the supply chainupstream and downstream enterprises, using backward induction method solve to obtain the equilibrium value and then get the conclusion. Study find, optimal R&Dperformance levels of two suppliers、manufacturer’s optimal production quantity、total profit of supply chain system and the profit of each enterprise are the biggest inthe complete cooperative, second in the half cooperative, smallest in the completelyuncooperative. Price of intermediate product in the half cooperative is smaller thanprice of intermediate product in the completely uncooperative. R&D subsidies whichmanufacturer gives to two suppliers in the half cooperative is bigger than R&Dsubsidies in the completely uncooperative.Chapter 4, constructs vertical cooperative R&D model of upstream anddownstream enterprises in supply chain under the venture capital, using game theoryto analyze the game relations between participants, using backward induction methodsolve to obtain the equilibrium value, finally get the conclusion. Study find that, alongwith the strengthen of R&D enterprises’ cooperation, R&D enterprises increase capitalinvestment by themselves, production quantity of supply chain increase, profit of eachparticipant also increase. Venture capitalist tend to implement a greater control to theenterprise which is in the dominant position in the supply chain and desire to improveits control right. If the rate of R&D success is bigger than or equal to the countdownof investment net income ratio of the venture capitalist, it is desirable for theenterprises to invest in R&D.Chapter 5, constructs supply chain cooperative innovation game model under thegovernment subsidies and incentives inside the chain, using three kinds of gamemethods to analyze the game relations between participants, using backwardinduction method solve to obtain the equilibrium value and then get the conclusion.Study finds, new added profit of the manufacturer in Nash equilibrium is the biggest,second in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, third in the collaborationequilibrium. New added profits of the same supplier in Nash equilibrium andsubgame perfect Nash equilibrium are equal, smaller in collaboration equilibrium. Inthree game equilibriums, utilities of the government in the subgame perfect Nashequilibrium and collaboration equilibrium are the same, if marginal revenue of twosuppliers are equal, utilities of the government in three game equilibriums are thesame.Finally chapter 6, summarizes the full paper, expound the limitations of thispaper and future research directions.