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The Research Of Waste Recycling Electronic Products Manufacturing Of Closed-loop Supply Chain Revenue And Expense Sharing Contracts

Posted on:2014-07-23Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:L H MoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2269330422952239Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the rapid development of the economy, the consumer’s requirements for electronicproducts personalized and diverse is getting higher; at the same time, with the developing ofthe public awareness of environmental protection, our government to promote the recyclingeconomy efforts gradual increase. Therefore, under the double pressure, electronicscompanies used electronic products for recycling and re-manufacturing is imminent, theclosed-loop supply chain contract not only affects the efficiency of the re-use of recycledresources but also can affects the closed-loop supply chain coordination, so the study wasteelectronic products recycling and remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain revenue andexpense sharing contract is essential important. This paper study from the following aspectsof waste electronic products recycling and remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain revenueand expense sharing contract:First, we introduce this paper’s research significance, research status, research ideas,methods, content and possible innovations, etc., and some related theory.Second,given the type of closed-loop supply chain contract and the recycling mode ofwaste electronic products, and to provide a framework for the subsequent contract research.Then built a supply chain decision model of random demand retailers who responsible forrecycling and third-party responsible for recycling remanufacturing closed-loop, fromnon-cooperative game and cooperative game two of the two recovery modes respectively,, byintroduce the revenue and expense sharing contract to coordination of non-cooperative gameremanufacturing closed-loop supply chain.Finally, compare to the two modes theory, which is seeking both recovery modeequilibrium solution, and then verified by numerical contract can effectively coordinate thecooperation between the members of the closed-loop supply chain.In summary, we get the conclusion:(1)on retailers recovery mode, non-cooperative gameorder quantity, recovery the price system profit is less than cooperative game, non-cooperativegame will cause the system overall profit missing;(2)on third-party recovery mode,non-cooperative games order quantity, recycling the price system profit is less thancooperative game situation, the non-cooperative game will cause the system overall profit willbe less;(3)in non-cooperative game model, on retail ordering the recall mode, recyclingprices and system profits are equal to the third-party recovery mode, so the two recoverymodes can be selected;(4)in cooperative game, on retailers recovery mode, the order quantity is equal to the third-party recovery mode Order Quantity recycling prices and systemprofits are higher than the case of the third-party recovery mode, so it is better to choose theretail recovery mode.Implementation of the revenue and expense sharing contract can raise the price of recyclingof waste electronic products to improve the amount of waste electronic products recycling, toprotect the environment, improve the consumer’s utility, regardless of what the recovery mode,and are able to coordinate the closed-loop supply chain. Retailers recovery mode is better thanthe third-party recovery mode, and now, the retailer is more greater than the number ofthird-party.
Keywords/Search Tags:waste electronic products (WEP), remanufacturing, closed-loop supply chain, revenue and expense sharing contract
PDF Full Text Request
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