Research On Profit Allocation Problem In Agricultural Products Supply Chain

In recent years, the frequent appearance of the quality and safety of agricultural products in China has been the focus of attention, the supply chain of agricultural products quality and safety issues also become a hot research.This paper studies from the consumer preferences of the the safety of agricultural products, and constructs a function about consumer surplus. It deals with a supply chain model which consists of manufacturers, distributors and consumers. The manufacturers, distributors and supply chain alliance are being divided into two categories A and B, category A does better in fulfilling safety responsibilities, category B does not so well.Under the condition of information symmetry, supply chain alliance can get more profit than enterprise’s pursuiting profit maximization respectively. A reasonable profit distribution factor can promote the cooperation of the members of the supply chain. In order to ensure the quality and safety of agricultural products status, reasonable allocation of responsibility for security in the agricultural product quality problems with the agreement, to compensate for the costs caused by the discharge of security responsibilities, then determine the final profit distribution factor through bargaining.Under asymmetric information, it may appear the phenomenon of expulsion of A class of agricultural products, the supply chain alliance shall be issued to the quality and safety signals. B-class agricultural products alliances can imitate when signal intensity within a certain range. Only when the signal strength is moderate, it can make the market ideal separating equilibrium to solve the problem of the "lemon market", and enhance the market competitiveness of A class alliance of agricultural products, and create a good social image, to promote the good of the entire market cycle. In addition, considering reputation model of agricultural products, repeated game reputation can constrain agricultural alliance and give up the reputation value for out future benefit, thus producing a kind of agricultural products.Finally, using the Netlogo model simulation, in a market without supervision, agricultural information cannot effectively be transferred. At this time, willingness to pay, and safe agricultural products consumers of safe agri-food psychological expectations can not promote the production of safe agricultural products, a class B enterprises of agricultural products quality safety general advantage; only in the market supervision agricultural products, safety information to exposure, a agricultural enterprises can take advantage in the competition, higher the exposure rate is, a more rapid expulsion of B products.