Physical Layer Security Research In Cooperative Communication Based On Dynamic Game

Wireless network is an important part of modern communication whoseapplication is quite extensive. Cooperation communication is a hot point ofcollaborative communication. In recent years, the relationship between cooperationcommunication and information security is a new hotspot. The cooperative wirelesstransmission which evolved from MIMO technology is built on the basis of mutualcooperation of the relay node. In amplifying forwarding scheme, the node forwardedthe signal of each other by mutually relay amplification for the cooperative diversitygain. Assuming that all the relay nodes have to comply with criteria for collaboration,a stable and efficient wireless coordination system can be achieved. However, due tothe collaboration need to consume extra energy transmission, a single node may notparticipate or part of the participation in order to maximize their own interests. Thenthe cooperation of all nodes to comply with the guidelines of cooperation can not beachieved. Therefore, it is meaningful to introduce a mechanism to detect poorbehavior to induce the node mutual cooperation.The collaboration mechanism design is the focus of current research. Game theoryas a decision-making theories are valuable for mechanism design. The paperintroduces a Bayesian dynamic game theory in economics, combined with thephysical layer node cooperation diversity theory, we build a node dynamic Bayesiangame model bused on trust and credibility. In the model we combine collaborationand security of the physical layer node. The paper makes an amplify and forwardsystem to establish a simple three-node model, Wyner wiretap channel model insecurity capacity as a security evaluation, the cost of the energy consumption of thenodes as the establishment of a utility function. After the relay nodes to cooperatefully, incomplete cooperation and completely uncooperative case, the utility functionof the source node and the relay node simulation results comparative analysis foundthat the dynamic game based on the credibility of the mechanism can effectivelysuppress the selfish behavior of the node, so the node select a reliable partner, so thatthe utility function optimal. And the mechanisms meet conditions of perfect Bayesianequilibrium.