Social Capital, Behavioral Environment And The Evolutionary Mechanism Of Corruption Equilibria

This article studies corruption evolution and models endogenously the micromechanism that decides the transition of corruption equilibria by capture social capital in theanalysis.The first part is literature review. Through making systematic survey of studies relatedto corruption, we attempt to find the direction our study aims to. Obviously, c larify theconceptual confusion with rent-seeking and corruption give the exactly object we try to study.It‘s a tough job on study corruption formation mechanism for there are particular phenomenasuch as disguised act, complex interest of players and environmental constraint etc. duringcorruption decision-making process. Theoretically, those reasons require us introduce strictlydefined concept from other subjects, and take them rigorously into economic analysis asendogenously variable, which on purpose to measure the probability of cooperation betweenindividuals. Methodologically, as a rising instrument, Evolutionary Game Theory can dealwith interaction effect in/between groups under existing environment commendably.In second part, using mathematic language, we aim to illustrate why society results tohigh/low corruption stably equilibrium, what makes this society run into chosen corruptionpath and which path be chosen in the long run. Two stable corruption equilibria exist underconditions of complete information, constant institutions and homogeneity among socialmembers. However, corruption becomes the dominant strategy for individual decisionmakers and the society is entrapped in high-corruption equilibrium when irrationality incollective behavior is out of control. Taking social capital into consideration, we found that,without institutional shocks, the level of mutual trust is crucial factor to form two steadyequilibria of corruption and decide which corruption path the society would be locked in. Bycontrast, incomplete information, heterogeneity among social members, administrativepower might be (accumulated) mutant factor which caused the change of the corruption pathin foreseeable periods.In third part, the theories proposed are tested with micro data and supported by thelogistic regression results. For purpose of testing assumptions mentioned above, we collectedmicro-data from National College Entrance Test of Art in china which contains149collegesand1541individual samples. After designed indicator system for each variable thosedescribe corruption object, motivation and behavior pattern, the empirical study run thegiven logistic regressions, then employ results to draw a stimulate curve of corruption path.Those efforts confirm the assumptions we inferred above.Finally, as a brief conclusion, a new policy proposal is put forward that control ofcorruption supply be strengthened.