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On The University Administrators' Corruption In The Perspective Of Rent-seeking Theory

Posted on:2009-03-10Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H B LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2167360245457793Subject:Higher Education
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The corruption of administrators in universities and colleges has constituted a great threat to higher education and social development in China, which has aroused social attention; however, there are few in-depth academic studies on this problem. What's more, the research on university administrators' corruption in the angle of rent-seeking theory is nearly a blank. This paper tries to introduce rent-seeking theory to make a research on university administrators' corruption, so as to propose some effective approaches to solve the problem.Firstly, this paper introduces the conception, character, types and main forms of corruption, and explains the rent-seeking theory. Combining with rent-seeking theory, it defines university administrators' corruption as an action that servants in universities or colleges who have certain power exert authority to obtain self-interest; it also proposes that university administrators' corruption, whose essence is an economic action, is rent-seeking corruption based on power. The character of university administrators' corruption has three main forms; and in this process of corruption, university administrators acquire rent in the forms of rent creation and rent extraction.Secondly, this paper analyzes the representations and causes of university administrators' corruption. It narrates the representations by sorting the corruption into two forms—visible corruption and invisible corruption; and based on the rent-seeking theory, it analyzes the causes of the corruption from two perspectives—external realistic basis and internal institutional origin.Finally, based on the analysis of the causes of university administrators' corruption, and on the preconditions of two realistic situations—large amount of rent is in the field of higher education, and university administrators' senses of rent-seeking are intensified, this paper proposes that the key to solve the problem of university administrators' corruption should be institutional constructing: consummate higher education system and reduce the rent in the field of higher education, so that they can not seek rent; reform the supervisory mechanism , increase the cost of corruption and compress the rent-seeking space, so that they dare not seek rent; improve the motivating institution for them to get what they want in a right way, so that they need not seek rent; strengthen the arrangement of informal institutions which may have an inner restriction on people's actions, so that they will not seek rent These aspects constitute a whole system; we have to carry out all these measures in balance and exert a comprehensive effect. Only in this way can we obtain an ideal result of solving the problem of university administrators' corruption.
Keywords/Search Tags:corruption, university administrators' corruption, rent-seeking, institution
PDF Full Text Request
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