Resraech On Supply Chain Coordination With The Quality And Contral Mechanisms Based On The Power Strrcture

As an increasingly competitive market, customers’requirements for product quality constantly improve, prompting companies to gain greater competitive advantage continuously improve product quality. Quality control of traditional instruments such as Total Quality Management, Six Sigma management as the main focus is on enterprise quality management. However, due to an increasingly dispersed and distance of the business area increased, product quality is good or bad depends more on the behavior of the members of the supply chain, a single enterprise for quality of products is becoming increasingly difficult to control. Therefore, enterprises to better control the quality of products on the basis of an internal quality control must be greater attention to the quality of the coordination mechanism between the members of the supply chain. Among them, the power structure what is the impact of supply chain coordination mechanism in supply chain members’ quality is an important factor. Different power structures will have a significant impact on supply chain coordination with the distribution of benefits between the members. Therefore, this article examines the use of game model under different power structures(upstream, downstream-oriented, and as a leading government leaders) to conduct an in-depth analysis of supply chain members, to build an effective coordination mechanism among members of supply chain members offer theory reference. This major works and the results are:First of all, through a lot of literature to, sum up the various modes of coordination and control of the quality of the supply chain, combed through the research process and key results of our predecessors, and noted that the existing deficiencies in the study to determine the content of this article and the research framework.Secondly, in uncertain demand and supply chain vendor (seller) as leader to study consists of a single vendor and a single retailer of quality of product of two-Echelon supply chain coordination mechanisms. Discusses centralized and decentralized models of supply chain members under quality management strategies, and further explore the members adopt the revenue sharing contract of supply chain quality policy, and finally comparing results of analysis. Analysis showed that compared with the dispersion model, revenue sharing contract of supply chain members get closer to the centralized mode of profit, where suppliers of first-mover advantage to full play and coefficient of equivalent quality must improve product quality level. Next, under the same topological structure of supply chain to research supply chain downstream (buyer) as the leading party, centralized supply chain quality control modes, dispersion models, and the results when using the buy-back contract balance. Analysis shows that when certain conditions are met, buy back contract of supply chain members’profits better than decentralized mode of profit.Then, taking into account the government’s effect on the behavior of members of the supply chain quality management, analysis of the government’s system of rewards and punishments and detection mechanisms to improve the quality of products. Analysis shows that reasonable government regulation can implement improvement in supply chain management, social welfare and profit can be improved.Finally, the introduction of competitive factors, consisting of both suppliers and retailers in the supply chain, vendor-side competition circumstances analysis modes, dispersion mode in the set, and balanced results on buy back contract.