Study On Revenue-sharing Contract For Logistics Service Supply Chain Under Prospect Theory

On the study of supply chain issues,it has a long history for scholars in researching products supply chain.But in recent years,the service supply chain has becoming a new trend in research field of a supply chain.As an important branch of service supply chain,the logistics service supply chain has getting more and more attention.Unlike physical goods,service product has the characteristics of invisibility,unstored and timeliness,and these characteristics raise new requirements in the study of logistics service supply chain.This paper take a logistics service integrator and a functional logistics service provider as the research object,and considering the market demand is stochastic.firstly,it set up a centralized control model and revenue-sharing model which the logistics service integrator is not think about risk and fair,then based on prospect theory,it respectively established a revenue-sharing contract model under three cases that logistics service integrator who has only think about loss-aversion,only think about fairness-concern and both think about loss-aversion and fairness-concern behavior factors,it analysis these three cases and the change of optimal decision that the members of the logistics service supply chain made under revenue-sharing contract,at last it gets the results through the numerical analysis,and then comparing the three kinds of behavior factors with logistics service supply chain members of the decision.Results show that:(1)When the integrators only have loss aversion behavior factor,the utility of integrator is reduced while loss-aversion coefficient increases,but revenue-sharing coefficient value,the optimal wholesale price and the effectiveness of a risk neutral supplier does not follow this varies.While the effectiveness of the whole supply chain will decrease when the loss-aversion coefficient increase.(2)When integrators only have fairness-concerns behavior factors,the revenue-sharing coefficient increases when the fairness-concerns coefficient increases,at the same time the integrator's utility increases,suppliers utility decreases,and the utility of the whole supply chain decrease with this varies.The optimal supply chain logistics service capability are equal to the capacity under the neutral condition.(3)Under the situation that integrators have loss-aversion and fairness-concerns behavior factors at the same time,when the loss-aversion coefficient,and fairness-concerns coefficient increases at the same time,wholesale prices,suppliers utility of the supply chain increase,revenue-sharing coefficient and integrators utility decreases,the effectiveness of the whole supply chain decreases.Then respectively fixed loss-aversion coefficient and fairness-concerns coefficient,and consider the influence on the supply chain when another coefficient change.Fixed fairness-concern coefficient,when loss-aversion coefficient increases,revenue-sharing coefficient and the optimal wholesale price decreases,and the utility of integrator also decreases,the effectiveness of suppliers and the whole supply chain increase.Then fixed loss-aversion coefficient,when fairness-concerns coefficient increases,revenue-sharing coefficient and the wholesale price increase,utility of integrators,suppliers and the whole supply chain reduce.The results show that the integrator who have loss-aversion behavior factors have the nagetive effects on the integrator and the whole supply chain,and it have no effect on the supplier.Integrators fairness-concerns behavior factors have positive effect on itself,and it create negative effect on supplier and the whole supply chain.When integrators have loss-aversion and fairness-concerns behavior factors at the same time,it have negative effect on integrator and the whole supply chain,and it create positive effect on supplier.