Research On Operation Optimization And Supply Chain Contract Coordination Considering Consumer’s Behavior

With the rapid development of the global e-commerce, electronic commerce has gradually become one way of the people consumption, its mode and apply present more flexible and variety. In the global supply chain network, the traditional trademode gradually transformed into e-commerce ones. In addition, many new research questions such as consumer‘s behavior problems have come out in the increasingly competitive market and the enterprise sales mode. The paper investigates the questions of decision about the dynamic game analysis of enterprise, designing contract coordination, improving supply chain performance and so on by adopting the theory of the game theory to construct the model is to meet the challenge. Which to find out the new mechanism and law of the e-commerce supply chain management It will provide decision-making of the supply chain enterprises based on the theroretical and practical gurdance. The main research contents are as follows:1. The e-commerce supply chain‘s contract coordination and optimization strategy problem under considering consumer‘s behavior and service level.(1) Revenue sharing contract drop-shipping supply chain considering service levelA newsvendor model has been built in drop-shipping supply chain system of one supplier and one online retailer, which is in pursurt of profit maximization and service level maximize simultaneously. The revenue sharing contract coordination problem has been argued under considering service level. The revenue sharing contract can accomplish to coordinate the supply chain and the supply chain performances under some certain conditions.(2) Study on Manufacturer’s Buy-back Policy in Two-stage E-commerce Supply Chain With the Customer Return PolicyA e-commerce supply chain model that adopts two-stage sales model of B2 C and C2 B in the lifecycle has been built. This study analysis that reaction of customers after they knew returns compensation in the first stage and that the effect of the first-stage reaction on optimal order quantity and optimal profit in the second stage, and it can be found that in the e-commerce supply chain, retailers‘ optimal return price are different in different stages. Through the analysis, retailers‘ optional return price can be changed by supplier repurchases and remanufacturing to achieve the coordination. On this basis, different types of supplier repurchases contracts were analyzed, and the results show that two-stage supply chain can be effectively coordinated by differentiating the repurchases contracts. In addition, if the products are non-perishable and remanufactured goods can be accepted by customers, differentiating the repurchases contracts in supplier remanufacturing can increase supply chain‘s overall profit more effectively.2. The research on the dynamic optimization between customer strategic behavior and enterprise information security behaviorEvolutionary game replication dynamic analysis method is used under the background of big data, information security evolutionary game model between consumer and enterprise behavior interaction is established. From the perspective of public participation, some main parameters are analyzed such as the strength of government rewards and punishment, enterprise information safety degree and so on, which impact on the choice of enterprise‘s information security behavior.3. The supply chain system dynamic optimization decision-making based on ―supply chain‘s reputation‖Differential game theory has been used to study the coupling process of supplier and retailer‘s cooperation in this paper. The process of cooperation is summarized as the process of the construction of "supply chain‘s reputation", and a dynamic model for supplier and retailer‘s cooperation differential game is built. And we obtain a set of optimal strategy under the three of Nash game、Stackelberg and collaborative. The result of the feedback is also compared and analyzed with the Hamilton-Jacobibellman equation. Results show that supply chain system‘s revenue under collaborative is higher than that of non-cooperative Nash and Stackelberg game; In the Stackelberg game, retailer is incentive factor to supply chain, which can improve retailer‘s, the whole supply chain system‘s revenue.