| Since the1970s, the traditional important economic species have beenover-exploited in the world. The fishery in the China costal waters also has beenoverfished. This condition is caused by the concept in which the natural fisheryresources are worthlessness. The main cause of this phenomenon is as follows: thefishermen can fish with free of charge of share fishery resources, the concept ofworthlessness for using natural resources has been existed in fishery and the fishermendid not pay for the cost for using the public fisheries resources, so that the rent is low ordoes not exist in the fisheries. As a result, fishermen increase their fishing effortcompetitively and the development economic of fishery resources will be impeded. Inorder to sustainable use fisheries resources, the paid principle of fisheries resourcesneed to be established in the process of exploitation, we can charged some resource rent.Therefore, in this paper, based on the value of natural resources and rent theory and theeconomic point of view the theory of value and rent theory, we reviewed the theoriesand methods of natural resource accounting at home and abroad to master the rentaccounting of fisheries resources, and establish the rent estimating methods of thefishery resources and take the important pelagic fish–Chub mackerel (Scomberjaponicus) as an example to estimate the rent of the fishery resources, which willprovide an guidance for sustainable use and scientific manage of fishery resources. Theresults were as follows:(1) Based on the concept of nature resources rent, combined with characteristics offisheries resources, the paper illustrates the concept of nature resources rent, analysesthe theory of land tax, theory of equity and externality theory of public goods. Inaddition to the character of fishery resources is limited as natural resources (scarcity),fishery resources also have the characters such as renewable, migration or mobility,sharing, changes in the amount of resources to environment and other characteristics.The ownership and property rights of fishery were separated so that the fishermen only have an emphasis on fishing right and ignore the conservation of fishery resources. Andthe "market failure" and negative externalities would be emerged in the opening accessof fishery. To address the above problems and according to foreign research statuswithin the fishery resource rent, it is necessary and feasible for us to implement the rentof coastal fishery resources. According to the status and methods of foreign researchabout fishery resources rent, these methods include quota rental fee, profit charge, lumpsum charge and price charge. In this paper we proposes the accounting theory andmethods for fishery resource, which will provide some scientific references forsustainable use and scientific manage of fishery resources.(2) It is found that the maximum annual production in2004reached389,000tons,a minimum production in2006is only253,000tons, the fishing effort in2005attainedup to33,700nets, a minimum fishing effort in2002is28,900nets, the maximumsustainable yield (MSY) attained342,800tons and the fishing effort is239,000netsbased on the date during1998to2008. Combination of actual production, the fishery ofChub mackerel in the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea is on the state of overfishing.In this paper, a dynamic bio-economical model was established by using fishery dataand fishing economic data from China, Japan, and South Korea during the period1998-2008, and considering the effect of the discount rate on resources exploitation ofChub mackerel in the East China Sea and Yellow sea. An appropriate discount rate isused to determinate the number of D accepted by current society, which is theproportion of short-time interests. The discount rate-supply curve was plotted foranalyzing the development and management of fishery resources in the catch prices.Results showed that the fishery was generally overfished. The declining resourceswould make the social and ecological benefits decrease. The discount rate rangedbetween10%and30%, and the short-term interests accounted for10%-20%of thelong-term interests. When the catch prices are2327-4654Yuan per ton, it can ensurethat the catch of Chub mackerel is less than the MSY, and the fishing effort can beeffectively controlled for the resources of Chub mackerel.(3) Combined with the production costs and catch prices of Chub mackerel fromfishery enterprises during2010to2011and different price of their age, we can get anincome for different body of Chub mackerel. This study suggests that the production ofindividuals for150~200g body weight (2-3years old fish) reached38,936tons, itsearnings is the highest of14.796one million Yuan. Followed by the individual more than500g body weight with4ages above, the production was10,827tons and theincome amounted to11.552million tones. The unit price is the highest reaching10,670Yuan per ton.(4) We estimated the rent loss of fisheries resources at the MSY in the East ChinaSea and Yellow Sea in2008by using bio-economic model. This study suggests that thetotal economic value of Chub mackerel is373.03million, the catch is worth of179.70million, while the economic value at MSY is157.89million in the East China Sea andYellow Sea in2008. With the growth of Chub mackerel, the economic value is13.81million and the annual average value increases, and fishing rent is9.81million.Therefore, the accumulative yield and benefit in the5years attained1.45megaton and0.40million Yuan, the accumulative yield and benefit in10years reached3.10megatonand1.27million Yuan, the accumulative yield and benefit in20years amounted to6.37megaton and3.04million Yuan. We also proposed a reform for coastal fisheriesresources management in China to reduce fishing intensity by charging resource rent,this method is not only to ensure the sustainable development of coastal fisheryresources, but also reflects the interests of resource owners.(5) Fishery has the attributes of public property. If we take measures to limitproduction in order to conserve fishery resources, but did not limit the fishing fleet intothe fisheries effectively, then the public property limiting the catch of the TAC or othermeasures inevitably will expand the fishing fleets, there is an excess fishing efforts andhuman capital which lead to the disappearance of resource rents. The efforts on rent losswill be not controlled unless it can effectively prevent the fishermen from receivingimproper stimulation or to change such methods. Therefore, it is recommended that theresource rent on fisheries management will be carried out in the future, and the resourcerent can be in the form of taxes to compensate for the loss of fisheries resources. |
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