A Study Of The Salary Incentive Mechanism Of Commercial Bank In China

Compensation system is one of the most significant components of incentive mechanismin commercial banks, also an effective way of corporate governance. Reasonable compensationsystem can effectively stimulate bank employee’ initiative,creativity and enthusiasm, which canexplore employees’ potential ability，and have them strive for the bank’s long-term development.Therefore, the significance of the research on the factors affecting China’s commercial bankspay incentives, and the efforts to establish a scientific, rational, efficient pay incentivesmechanism can never be exaggerated.The first part of this thesis describes the domestic and overseas theory in this field, whichincludes concept, types of pay and incentive pay. It describes salary incentive theory, consisted ofthe compensation theory and incentive theory, compensation theory, including the wage theoryof the equilibrium price, the minimum wage theory, wage differentials theory, sharing ofeconomic theory, marginal productivity wage theory and Keynesian theory. Incentive theory, ismade of the hierarchy of needs theory, ERG theory, two-factor theory, reinforcement theory,equity theory, expectancy theory and principal-agent theory, etc.The second part analyzes the current state of China’s commercial banks pay incentivesmechanism with the help of data table and data map, and figures out the problems within thecommercial banks pay incentives, that is not fully linked pay and bank performance, single andirrational structure of salary form, pay gap between executives and employees and deficiency ofimplicit incentives.The third part is the research on some real examples in China’s commercial banks payincentives. By collecting and correlating the relevant data and variables, and initializing themodel, the influencing factors, it regressive analysis China’s commercial banks pay system. Theresearch result demonstrate that China’s commercial banks staff salaries basically is linked withbank performance and risk, but not in close contact. The remuneration of the executives did notshow a significant relationship with the bank performance and risk.According to the current situation of the compensation system in commercial banks， thefourth part puts forward salary incentive mechanism design elements and ideas from differentpositions of commercial banks，including the decision-making position, management position, professional and technical position, marketing position and the angle of the Manager position.Finally, this thesis posts some suggestions to optimize the bank’s internal pay incentivesfrom the perspective of position salary, performance assessment, public salary income, adjustingthe structure, laying emphasis on long-term incentive, and some opinions to improve theexternal environment of the pay incentives from the management model and legal system.