The Relationship Of Commercial Bank Executives Salary Incentive System And Performance In China

In the United States, the bank executive pay and performance-linked pay system exits a long time. Improve corporate governance mechanisms as a means of banks in the world has been widely promoted. On the World nineties, China carried out a bold reform of the banking sector, China’s commercial banks out of executive governance gradually establish a modern management style corporate governance system. Accordingly, the development bank executive pay is also from the planned economy era of the "eating the same big pot" and "egalitarian" and is gradually changed to performance-linked pay model. Pay for performance system as an important modern corporate incentives to improve the efficiency of corporate governance, investor protection plays an important role. As time goes by, China’s listed commercial banks have initially established a merit pay system, which run effects? Whether paid executives of listed companies can improve performance? We still need to study these issues in depth to explore the scientific and rational. It has great referential value to retain and attract talent and accelerate the reform of salary system for Mainland banks by studying China Commercial Bank executive compensation incentive system and the relationship between bank performance, development of executive compensation to master the law of the Mainland banks. This article systematically and comprehensively evaluates and analyses the business the status of bank executives pay system and analyses relationship between the commercial banks with the Bank of executive compensation and business performance by selecting the listed commercial banks Bank of executive compensation and the relationship between performance as a research topic and by taking the latest data of China A shares of 14 listed commercial banks 2004-2009 as study sample, In this paper, theoretical analysis and empirical analysis of research methods are adopted to achieve the aims of this thesis. On one hand, this article discussed the existing theory of the performance pay system as an important incentive mechanism under the modern corporate system according to the principal-agent theory and human capital theory, which paved the way for necessay and theoretical analysis of Empirical Study. On the other hand, it empirically prove the relationship between performance and executive compensation incentive system of China’s commercial banks according to the CITIC Bank, Huaxia Bank, Industrial Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank, Construction Bank, Bank of 14 samples of executive pay and performance report data. Meanwhile, the status of commercial banks in China executive compensation incentive system is analyzed in this airticle. Finally, a sound system of executive compensation incentive measures and recommendations are put forward according to the article theoretical analysis, situation analysis and empirical test results of commercial banks.This paper is divided into four sections, namely, the first chapter, Chapter of Commercial Bank’s executive compensation incentive system status, empirical analysis of ChapterⅢandⅣmain conclusions and policy recommendations. for the structure, theoretical analysis is firstly adopted and then empirical analysis is adopted, and then some policy recommendations are given according to issuses discoved in accordance with the logical structure of theoretical and empirical analysis.