Convenient Transportation Service Under The Condition Of Spare Parts Supply Chain Downstream Quantity Coordination Mechanism Research

There is an increasing concern about the spare parts in the context of thetransformation from traditional manufacturing to service industries. Due to the spareparts’ characters, such as long cycle, poor substitutability, unpredictability, high priceand inventory cost etc., as well as the favorable objective factor, like the increasinglyconvenient transportation, the agents’ order quantity is always lower than that of theactual demand. Therefore, this paper does some research on this phenomenon and triesto avoid the tendency that some agents would take the rapid transportation instead of theinventory which would greatly lead to the reduction of the order quantity.In this paper, suppliers of spare parts outsource their marketing and after-sales toa service provider integration which is regarded then as a core enterprise. Driven by thecustomer demand, taking advantage of the modern information technology, theintegration service enterprise formulates some contracts to coordinate the relationshipsamong the joint enterprises in the supply chain, so as to achieve the increase in servicevalue. And coordinating mechanism of order quantity in this paper means theintegration enterprise adjusts the agent’s order quantity to the optimum amount byadopting the measure of establishing the penalty coefficient and incentive coefficient (ie,the profits of integration service enterprise and agent would achieve the Paretoimprovement). This paper also provides a review on the studies of service supply chain,coordination of supply chain, as well as parts logistics, then standing in the serviceintegrator’s shoes, establishes and discusses the profit models of integration serviceenterprise and agent by adjusting the penalty coefficient and incentive coefficient.First of all, original model, penalty model, incentive model, penalty and incentivemodel are established in both cases with or without considering value losses. The resultsshow that the supply chain is difficult to be coordinated if service integrator contributesnothing, however, by adjusting the penalty coefficient α and incentive coefficient β, thecoordination can be finally achieved which means likewise the profits of the serviceintegrator, agent and centralized decision-making organ would be increased. Secondly, on the basis of theoretical studies, this paper has done some practicalresearch, numerical analysis and simulation experiments according to the case ofChengdu Kobelco, which not only verifies the results of those theoretical studies, butalso extends and enriches them. The simulation data indicates that the changingregularities of agent’s optimal order quantity, integration service enterprise’s profit,agent’s profit and centralized decision-making organ’s profit when αandβchanges.