A Study On Coalition-Proof Incentive Mechanism Designing For Enterprise Alliance

Enterprise alliance is a competition-and-cooperation organization mode and an organizational arrangement which can realize mutual cooperation among two or more independent enterprises. There exist high opportunistic risks in enterprise alliances, so it involves specific control-and-incentive problems. However, the incentive problems in enterprise are different from unilateral incentive ones which is investigated by classic principal-agent theory. Therefore, it is necessary to reinvestigate this problem from a new angle of view.This dissertation makes research on incentive mechanism designing and the correlative problems by use of informational economics, cooperative game theory and enterprise alliance theory comprehensively. First of all, it constructs mutually-incentive model in team production, which includes principal-agent model as a special case, by introducing team welfare function, and investigates characteristics of solutions to the model. Then, the model is applied to incentive mechanism designing in enterprise alliance. In addition, the specific incentive models are set up for Leader-Member Alliance with only an absolute principal enterprise and Equality Alliance with two or more enterprises being principals and all members being agents, and for Knowledge Alliance and Joint-stock Alliance, respectively. Coalition-proof mutual incentive model is constructed by introduction of coalition-proof mechanism. Finally, it investigates implementation problem of coalition-proof incentive mechanism, and presents sufficient conditions for existence of solutions, and points out existence of equilibrium in corresponding dynamic game.By research it shows: in independent work teams, there exits mutual principal- agent relationship among team members, so mutual incentive is needed in such a team to overcome moral hazards such as slack-off and free-riding problems.Team members'mutual incentive can be implemented by profit-share plan, and profit-share rule can be represented by team welfare function, which, theoretically, is a solution to cooperative game. By introducing team welfare function, principal-agent model can be generalized as mutually incentive model.In order to prevent coalition of partial members, it needs to introduce coalition- proof mechanism in an independent work team. In fact, if the pay vector, which is the minimal pay for team members, lies in the core of the maximal coalition, coalition of partial members can't happen. coalition-proof mutual incentive model can be established by introducing coalition-proof mechanism into mutual incentive model.A solution to coalition-proof mutual incentive model doesn't exit necessarily. However, the sufficient conditions are established to ensure that the solution exists. Especially, there always exists equilibrium of the dynamic model corresponding to coalition-proof mutual incentive model if disorganization of the alliance can be also treated as an equilibrium.Equilibrium can be always realized if there exists a solution to coalition-proof mutual incentive model, because mechanism-designer has first-move advantage. The mechanism-designer can always select some equilibrium to put in practice, theorefore, multi-equilibrium dilemma problem does't exist.