| This dissertation, employing the essential models of motivation mechanism, gives further investigations of the incentive mechanism of China's commercial banks, and the purpose is to develop and promote the existing theoretical structure of incentive and restrictive mechanisms.To achieve the research objectives, this dissertation is organized as follows:firstly, the essential back ground will be provided from previous system of client manager as well as the practical situations, and the characteristics and functions of client manager, who can be taken into account as special group in China's commercial bank, will be introduced. Secondly, the definitions, characteristics, effects and other aspects, such as the system of client manager, incentive and restrictive mechanisms, principal-agent theory will multilaterally be illustrated, while providing the essential theoretical foundations for the determined adequate stimulating and restricting mechanism for China's commercial banks. Furthermore, in terms of major problems, such as the manifestations of acting in excess of authority, to be wordly-wise and play safe, role conflicting, etc. can definitely be revealed from the analysis of the practical situations, and the main reasons will be provided. Moreover, as far as mentioned problems are concerned, the designed solutions, both incentive and restrictive, will be provided relatively.In this paper, as a double-edged sword, incentive can clearly be considered to conflict with restrictive. From mental and physical aspects, the individual interests of client manager, to great extent, can be fulfilled by motivational pattern, while measures of control are confined by the means of law, morality and others. Generally, the cost of management can clearly be increased by the excess application of incentive and restrictive. The excess application of incentive inevitably results in the lack of restrictive, vice versa. Meanwhile, incentive also shows a clear relation with restrictive. On the contrary, the outcome is the loss of efficiency, while deficiency of incentive. Therefore, the establishment of adequate mechanism implies the feature of compatibility between incentive and restrictive. The potential loss caused by the pursuit of business expansion on a large scale should be avoided. In this paper, an inadequate mechanisms of incentive and restrictive results in an inefficient system of client manager. Therefore, To improve this issue is of importance to examine the degree of market efficiency of client manager system, which is directly related with development of an China's bank, and provides valuable reference for investors and regulatory authority, especially for the current reform of China's commercial banks from theoretical and empirical application relatively.The particular mechanism related with the client manager in China's commercial banks will be concerned, and the potential interpretations will further be explored based on the empirical results. In term of incentive mechanism, it is essential to establish a diversified mechanism, involving unphysical, physical even personalized pattern. As far as restrictive is concerned, a right combination of system, technique and culture should be considered. A scientific performance evaluation mechanism related with the stimulating and restricting mechanism enhances a motivating environment so that it can stir the deputy to work hard for the client to realize the targeted interest. |
