The Implementation Of The Projects The Owner And The Contractor Game Behavior Analysis Research

Project management process is that the owner, through the form of contract, entruste the contractor to complete a function and objectives consistent with the constructive tasks in the limited resources and limited time conditions. It makes the whole system more complex projects, risk and confounding factors have increased to couple with the construction project has a long cyclical, investment, single and irreversible characteristics. Because of these, the whole process exists a lot of the problem of asymmetric information between owners and constractors.As a result of inconsistencies in information asymmetry and the target, the contractors use their information advantage to adopt some illegal in order to maximize their own interests.How to deal with the problem of asymmetric information, owners and contractonrs to resolve conflicts of interest, is the key to successful project management.In this paper, standing on the angle of the owners, through the construction of the game model, the use of rigorous mathematical and logical and strong language, the aritcal describe and reflect the image of the engineering project owners and contractors during the course of the game occurred, and explain the construction market today contractors cut corners on the reasons for such behavior. Through analysis of the results of Bayesian equilibrium, the behavior of both mastered the game of law and the reasons for this result-information asymmetry and the owners and contractors conduct their own self-interest. On this basis, concluded that:owners of the information process as a game underdog, the contractor in order to prevent moral hazard, should strengthen supervision at the same time, consider the balance between costs and benefits of monitoring the problem, therefore, proposed The concept of the optimal level of supervision.Through the use of incentive and restriction mechanism design theory, the introduction of cost-plus contract in the form of linear incentive contract, considering the cost and schedule incentives incentive effect on the duration, the article establish incentives between owners and contractors mathematical models, and how the owners makes use of incentive contracts to pay their minimum contract also encourage contractors to achieve the purpose of the contractor to pay the additional cost of compressed schedule, the optimal revenue.Finally, this article use an example project to demonstrate the effectiveness and feasibility of incentive model and provide some reference program in the design of incentive contract for owners. This ultimate goal is to apply these theories and mechanisms designed to address the moral hazard problem contractors.