Principal - Agency Theory Under The Enterprise Management Incentives

With the continuous improvement of the modern enterprise system, resulting in the process of modern enterprise separation of ownership and management rights, the principal - agent theory has become a core theory, which can resolve the issue of business manager's incentive. Thus, the enterprise manager's incentives and constraint issue with the principal-agent theory became the focus of attention.Based on the traditional principal-agent theory and principal-agent question information dissymmetry or result uncertainty, this thesis transforms the enterprise owners to manager's incentive question as to the single manager's static drive and the many managers' dynamic incentives, in view of different incentive question, and brings in the corresponding incentive factor to establish a enterprise manager incentive mechanism which urges the enterprise to develop forward unceasingly.The main works are as follows:1. According to single manager's static incentive and the model of Chinese current enterprise manager annual salary system, this thesis induct game relationship as well as the corresponding strategy of choice between the enterprise owner and enterprise manager in the company management and operation, and utilizes the structural character and economic identity of Cobb-Douglas production function. At the same time, it takes the analysis to the restriction various factors of the enterprise manager's annual salary income. Furthermore, it establishes the corresponding incentive mechanism and illuminates attitudinal discrepancy and countermeasure influence between client and agent from different risk attitude.2. For more than one manager's dynamic incentive, this thesis takes the Chinese telecommunications industry as the example. On the basis of traditional oligarch competition of Stackelberg and Cournot, it analyzes the profits of Chinese telecommunication enterprises, and utilizes the profits to structure the multi-task principal-agent model of three key telecommunication enterprises, which is built to quantitatively research the incentive of professional managers. In this paper we reveal Principal-agent mechanism as well as the telecommunication enterprises operating mechanism of power between the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and telecommunication enterprises.The enterprise manager incentive mechanism is systemic and deeply discussed in this thesis, and it is useful of enterprises' development in the future.