Study On Principal-agent Model Under Asymmetry Information And Manager Incentive Of Listed Company

Principal-agent theory is mature after more than thirty years development, and it has beenused in many fields, just as industrial organization, enterprise efficiency, banking, insurance.But the domestic research and application in manager incentive of principal-agent theory arejust beginning, lacking of depth and width. With the improvement of the market economy, thelisted companies are more and more standardized, and managers incentive are getting moreand more attention, because managers are the key resources in listed company. On the basic ofprevious research, this paper study on the performance evaluation system and incentivemethods of the managers in listed company by the tool of principal-agent model.Studying on Principal-agent Model under Asymmetry Information and ManagerIncentive of Listed Company, the main text included: First, summarize related theories ofmanager incentive, and introduce principal-agent theory in details. Second, analysis the causeof the problems of managers incentive, then list the problems existing in listed company inchina. Third, construct principal-agent incentive model under asymmetry information, takingthe owners and managers of listed company as example. Then obtain the necessity of managerincentive associating their performance. Four, establish the listed company managersperformance evaluation system as the objective basis for the manager incentive. Finally,propose the countermeasures of manager incentive according with the result of evaluation.This paper's main innovation is lay in providing objective basis for manager incentive,and proposing different countermeasures of manager incentive, make incentive andperformance together. Just for reference to manager incentive of listed company in china.