Research On Incentive Mechanism In Outsourcing Of Enterprise Informationazation Construction Project Based On Principal-agent Theory

With the development of enterprise information construction project, the project outsourcing model has changed from the traditional two sides to the new model which involved of the third-party consulting service provider, the system provider and the enterprise. In this paper, the author adopt the principal-agent related theory to divide the relationship of the enterprise and the agents into two phases according to the nature of their work, then analyzed the characteristics of each stage of the principal-agency relationship. On this basis, the author established a two-stage principal-agent incentive model to study the problems of multi-task coordination equilibrium between the enterprise and the consulting service provider, and the teamwork incentives between the enterprise and the consulting service provider and the system provider.According to the multi-objective of the consulting service provider’s work, the author established a multi-task principal-agent incentive model in the first phase, obtained the relationship between the optimal incentive intensity coefficient and the related variables, then drew some valuable conclusions through analyzing the effect of the enterprise’s marginal expectations of the benefits, the consulting service provider’s absolute risk aversion, the absorbability and the marginal cost of the change rate of tasks on the optimal incentive intensity coefficient. And then the author divided the agent’s effort into the effort of his own work and the effort of help other agent, established the second phase principal-agent team incentive model by setting the agent’s income depends on the output of other agent, analyzed the relationship of between the optimal incentive intensity coefficient of agents’ different effort and the agent’s different cost coefficient of the effort, the exogenous variables variance of the output function, the absolute risk aversion of agents.Finally, this thesis proposed some valuable suggestions and measures for the enterprise to develop incentive contracts and adjust the incentive intensity coefficient based on the analytical results of each stage model. The enterprise can design the rational incentive mechanism to ensure the successful of the whole enterprise information construction project according to the result of this paper.