Marx Personified Production And The Incentive Mechanism For Managers In State-owned Enterprise

State-owned enterprise chief managers are the business leader, the business organizer and policy-makers, are to determine the rise and fall of the state-owned enterprises. The role of the mangers depends primarily on the merits of those internal factors, as the internal factors cause the basic changes; however, after all, external factors as changing conditions, also are not overlooked. Incentives for managers is a very important external factors. The incentives of managers, meaning acting on the parties, are the various external conditions and constraints in order to make the managers well played the role of business.Incentives for enterprise managers, as an external factors plays a significant role, excellent incentive mechanism makes the managers done in a better way. Therefore, how to build the state-owned enterprise incentive mechanisms, the problem relates to the efficiency of state-owned enterprise, thus affects the national economy that has a leading role in the state-owned economy, must be in the guidance of Marxism theory to give the scientific answer.As the introduction of the full text, the first chapter presents the research background, meaning and significance of research, the incentive mechanisms of the state-owned enterprises managers have been studied both inside and outside; then, points out its framework.ChapterⅡtoⅣpresents the basis on the building China's state-owned enterprise managers incentives. First of all ,the second chapter in the definition of "state-owned enterprises", "operator", "incentive", "incentive mechanical" concept, presents the Marx personified production. Then, in Chapter III, the economic benefits of state-owned enterprises are provided; then presents the special operator responsible for consequences of the material basis and pressure of the state-owned enterprises. Practice shows that state-owned enterprises in market competition is not as "privatization" as claimed on the natural, inevitable inefficiency. On the contrary, the state-owned enterprises have higher efficiency than the private sector, state-owned enterprise managers also have their own unique responsibility for the consequences and pressure approach. Chapter IV we analyses some theories that impede building the incentive mechanism of stated-owned enterprise: as the owner of state-owned enterprises are not set, the state-owned enterprises are inefficient; all people are selfish, in order to improve enterprise the company must own all the operators ; due to the intrinsic endowments of public capital, their operators can not have their own things, so only allowing the operator to enjoy the residual claim and have their own private capital, can create an effective incentive for them; only those with absolute control over the enterprise , with all or a majority stake can achieve efficient business. These views are untenable in theory. ChapterⅤtoⅥ, on the basis of the theoretical study, combined with the concrete practice of state-owned enterprise reform ,offer some constructive comments on how to build the state-owned enterprise managers incentives. First of all ,Chapter V builds the incentives model for State-owned Enterprises. Then, Chapter VI discusses how to establish and perfect an effective incentive mechanism for state-owned enterprise managers.