The Research Of Incentive Mechanism Under Dual Information Asymmetry

In the 1930s, with the development of socialization of production, the modern enterprise system of separating in two rights hade replaced the traditional enterprise's system in which this two rights unified, and consequent occurring of the"manager revolution"had made the efficiency problem inside the enterprise which were brought by the separating in two rights emerged. Incentive problem invited the economists'attention. A lot of economists researched the incentive theory in economic field by game theory as analysis tools. Then, the incentive theory which was unique in management had been divided into two theory systems, the management field and economic field. Among them, on the basis of strict logic analysis and mathematics demonstration, and considering the asymmetry information, the incentive theory of economics designs the incentive and restriction mechanism. The incentive theory of management which based on the psychological characteristics and the characteristics of behavior based on psychological characteristics is a theory to research the incentive mechanism. With the rapid improvement of the game theory, the incentive theory evolves swiftly. But the application of the incentive model of most economics is not good.This thesis concentrates on studying carefully to the current incentiveal theory on the basis of the situation of economics development above, and will synthesize the two major branches of the theory: the incentiveal theory of economics and incentiveal theory of the management carry on comprehensive comparative analysis, and analyze them. The author finds that the precondition of the incentive mechanism design in management is to suppose symmetry information and according to the agent's demand.All the precondition of the incentive mechanism design in economics is to suppose one information asymmetry which is about agent's proceeding and suppose the symmetry informant ion before the design. But in fact, there is double information asymmetry for which the principal can not know the final result while designing the incentive mechanism. Because of this discrepancy between the supposition and the fact, the application of the incentive model of most economics is not good. So this text improves the"New Soviet Incentive Model"which was provided by an American scholar–Weitzman, and consider about the second information asymmetry. As a result, a new model is designed in this text.After proving by mathematics method and through case analysis, I analyze the effect of the new incentive model and get the conclusion : the proved New Soviet Incentive Model (Ⅰ) and New Soviet Incentive Model (Ⅱ) are according to the request of incentive absolutely and the effect of incentive during the models are used in practice is very perfect. At last, I hope that the two models can make a little contribution to solving actual problem.