Incentive And Restraint Analysis Of China Securities Investment Fund

This article reorganizes the representative research achievements of home and abroad to incentive and restraint analysis of fund, begins at the current fundamental structure of fund governance,analyzes the defects and dilemma of governance mechanism,introduces basic incentive-restraint theory and puts the analysis under principal agent structure. From the angle of contract,the paper studies optimum reward contract and agent costs under the condition of symmetry and asymmetry information and relative performance comparison,analysizes two phases dynamic incentive contract,builds dynamic model which combines short-term profit with long-term profit and combines reputation incentive with matter incentive,discusses the supervising problem of infor-advantagers under fixed and incentive wage which makes the fund-holder can weigh profits and costs,choosing the optimum supervising strength to seek the optimum net profit. In the environment construction part used by game theory, internal,external and the third party governance should embrace the contract and conduct environment construction from the environment of system,law and market,make the governance way more smooth.This paper provides fund governance with new minds through contract design and environment construction which improves the credit problem and conducts the norm development of fund.Before conclusive discussion, the paper summarizes this article's research, and proposed the question which further research need to develop.