The Research Of Moral Risk Controlling On Chinese Fund Management Company

As the birth of Securities Investment Fund in British, it has got fleetly developed in the world. Going with the development of economy and securities business, innovation continually appearing in finance, and the scale of Securities Investment Fund getting much enlargement, it has come into being a very important part of financial market. For every country have different background, Fund has formed two supervision systems: concentrative supervision which American is the model and self-discipline supervision which British is the model. According to the reality, China has chosen concentrative supervision as the Fund's supervision system. It is a short time since the Fund commenced in china, market economy is imperfect, and the copulate surroundings are immaturity. Therefore, there are many problems in operating and managing Securities Investment Fund. And Fund Mangement Company's Moral Risk is the serious problem in Securities Investment Fund's supervising in China.Just for the above case, this article is composed by four chapters to study Chinese Fund Mangement Company's Moral Risk problem: the first chapter is the preface, which studies the meaning of the choosing and the studying actuality of the title. The second chapter introduces Securities Investment Fund's supervision systems in the world, compares American Securities Investment Fund's supervision and British Securities Investment Fund's supervision, and analysis the actuality and problems of Securities Investment Fund's supervision existing in china. The third chapter firstly describes Fund Mangement Company's Moral Risk problem in four main aspects in China: first is inside dealing, second is affiliate dealing, third is herding, and fourth are some other improper dealing activities, such as fraudulent activity and manipulation of fund market. Then, this article analysis the cause of Fund Mangement Company's Moral Risk, establishes a model of moral risk game relations to analysis Chinese supervision policy of Fund Mangement Company's Moral Risk. From this model, a result is revealed why present supervision policy is invalid to Fund Mangement Company's Moral Risk. Depending on the anterior conclusion, firstly, the fourth chapter establishes another model of moral risk game relations to analysis Chinese supervision policy of Fund Mangement Company's Moral Risk, and devises a new optimization scheme to solve Fund Mangement Company's Moral Risk problem. Secondly, this chapter studies the affiliation between moral and capital, got a result that moral is some capital. In this base, this article go on studying that corporation reputation is the reflection of moral capital, and Fund Mangement Company corporation reputation influence strongly Fund Mangement Company's Moral Risk. Thirdly, this chapter brings forward to set up the perfect information revelation system and well-trust system. Up to now, a result is clear that it is considerable effect to prevent and control Fund Mangement Company Moral Risk problem to constitute a favorable reputation system. Through all these efforts, China would establish a bran-new Securities Investment Fund system, Fund Mangement Company's Moral Risk would be prevent in effect, legal interests of fund investors would be protected roundly, and Securities Investment Fund market would be in normal order.