A Game Analysis Of Moral Hazard In Venture Capital

Venture capital originated from the Europe, particularly developed in the United States, it has been decades of history. However, exist in the venture capital system caused by moral hazard of agency costs, greatly influences the efficiency of venture capital. It is inevitable that moral risk occurs even if in western countries circumstances where have strong economic systems and full-fledged risk capital and high-tech enterprise, whereas Chinese venture capital started late, and economic system is enough distempered, legal system not enough perfect, currently also exists many problems:for example lack of effective evaluation of moral risk, means that have not established moral risk evaluation of indicators system and risk metric model, venture capital manager market not established up, lack of excellent venture capitalist meanwhile, furthermore, incentive and constraint mechanism relative are lacking, and compensation of venture capitalist is unreasonable. Concurrently, analysis the causes of moral hazard, as well as how to deal with moral hazard, are of great theoretical value and practical significance.First, this article utilizes the evolves stable strategy (ESS) as the core evolution game theory analysis method and he dynamic game theory research technique, research long time of risk entrepreneur chooses "immorality" the behavior community proportion change tendency and the evolution stability, seeking the intrinsic root, mechanism of action and key aspect which this kind of "immorality" behavior does not produce, to establish the gambling model of venture capitalist and risk entrepreneur moral hazard, in order to make sure that whether the entrepreneur does have the choice immoral behavior, thus to formulate the essential and reasonable incentive mechanism.Second, in the research of moral hazard measurement, due to not quantitative calculation, so we use Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to quantitative analysis and calculate the moral hazard. We establish the evaluation system of moral hazard by AHP, to quantify the factors of influence moral hazard, and identify the magnitude relation model between the factors and the target, in order to prevent moral hazard more effectively in the future. Finally, this article draws the following conclusion:(1) Through the mathematical analysis of evolution game theory, the risk entrepreneur has the moral hazard to be decided the expected revenue and surveillance of other venture capitalist, moreover influence to other risk entrepreneur whether to have the moral behavior stable strategy;(2) Due to the finiteness of principal-agent mechanism’s effectiveness, the measure which the guard risk entrepreneur moral hazard occurs should b,e introduce the incentive mechanism primarily, including material stimulation and spiritual stimulation (moral stimulation). The venture capitalist should carry on the restraint by stages the capital input and the stockholder’s rights arrangement to the risk entrepreneur.(3) the main body of moral hazard is risk entrepreneur, the identical influencing factor is dissimilar in the different investment stage by the influence weight, invests strategy to be possible reduce the moral hazard effectively the occurrence by stages.