Study On The Prevention Of Moral Hazard Of Logistics Finance From The Perspective Of Game Equilibrium

Currently, there are so many Small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) facedwith the problem of capital chain tension and financing difficulties. As an innovativefinancial product of third-party logistics service, logistics finance has created businessopportunities for closer cooperation among financial institutions, third-party logisticscompanies and finance companies, especially in terms of solving the problems offinancing difficulties.However, there are still some problems since the logistics finance service isbeing at the preliminary stage of development, especially for the new risk that the newbusiness model brings to the financial institutions and logistics companies in adifferent way, and particularly, moral hazard is the most evident item. Therefore, howto manage the moral hazard reasonably and effectively is very important for thesmooth development of logistics financial business. The previous studies often paymore attention to evaluate and measure the objective factors of financing companies.Actually, in comparison with the objective credit risk, subjective moral hazard is moredifficult to be controlled because of its subjectivity which is mainly caused by theinformation asymmetry among participants.First, this paper elaborates some concepts and theory related to the main contents,such as logistics finance, information asymmetry, agency theory, game theory, gameequilibrium, moral hazard and so on, and sorts out the agency relationship among theparticipants in logistics finance, based on these two parts, then it identifies how themoral hazard of logistics finance generates.Then, it analyzes a traditional model between financing enterprises and financialinstitution under traditional mode and another model among tripartite participantsunder logistics financial mode from the perspective of game theory and gameequilibrium. Through the selection and derivation of the model, we can have a moreprofound understanding of default risk of logistics finance and recognize what factors can inhibit the probability of default or conspiracy between finance companies andthird-party logistics enterprises, and then, it analyzes the impact to moral hazard oflogistics finance when the financing enterprise makes different actions andsummarizes conclusions related to the prevention of the moral hazard and putsforward suggestions of prevention.Finally, it proves the conclusions through the combination of the model andexample through the model of game equilibrium in the context of the bank of H. Thispaper combines qualitative and quantitative methods to study the root causes andprevention of the subjective moral hazard in logistics finance which has boththeoretical and practical significance.